Hello, and welcome to today's webinar titled Contemporary Trends in Cargo Theft. I'm Lillian Coulson, and I'm pleased to introduce today's webinar. Please be aware of the IMUA statement. It's my pleasure to introduce today's presenters. Captain Essam Wadhwani completed pre-engineering studies at a university in Bombay, India, and he earned a Class I Master Mariner certification from College of Maritime Studies in South Shields, England, in 1987. He then took off traversing the world while working in capacities, including as a principal surveyor since 1990. Captain Wadhwani has represented P&I Club, Hull and Machinery, and Cargo Underwriters, and others as a marine surveyor and insurance adjuster based in Los Angeles and Long Beach. In 2002, Captain Wadhwani launched Transit Risk Management and is employed as its president. He was honored by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Cargo Tax Unit for assistance provided to the Stolen Cargo Program. Jeff Hall, a graduate of Indiana State University, has over 30 years continuous service in the private investigative business, specializing in theft and fraud cases as they relate to railroad, shipping, and the insurance industry. He has performed work in rural and urban areas throughout the United States, Canada, and Mexico, and has been deposed and testified in state, federal, municipal, and union venues throughout the country. As a result of performing nationwide, Mr. Hall has federal, state, and municipal law enforcement contracts throughout North America. Mr. Hall is currently a principal and private investigator at Transit Risk Management. And it has been our pleasure to have both Captain Wadhwani and Mr. Hall as past webinar presenters for IMUA. Our third presenter, Curtis Salisbury, is also a principal and private investigator at Transit Risk Management. He has been involved in the investigative field in the USA for 13 years, and in Mexico and Latin America for 30 years. He is fluent in English, Portuguese, and Spanish. Mr. Salisbury is well-respected in the insurance field for recoveries in Mexico and Latin America. He has been engaged in training of industry associates in the cargo theft field in the U.S. and CTPAT certified. Gentlemen, the floor is all yours. Thank you, Lillian, and thanks to IMUA for presenting this. Thanks to all the participants for joining. It's a good partnership if we all get together and try to solve our problems of cargo crimes. Good morning and good afternoon to everyone in their time zones. Lillian and Eileen, my presentation is not moving here. It's not moving. Okay, so if you use that bottom arrow, I'll switch a slide now. Okay, I got it. Okay, perfect. I got it. Okay, great. Folks, this was a video which you'll get a link to through IMUA. It was actually a little bit funny, so we thought we'd start on a humorous note. These two guys, this is a real video. These two guys come in the night. They're trying to throw bricks at the container. The guy on the left actually throws the brick on his friend's head and he falls down. So we thought it was pretty humorous to start off with, but the video doesn't work on this presentation. Oh, it just works. It doesn't show on this screen. Oh, it is working, yeah. Oh, excuse me. I'm watching it. Can we watch it? These two fellows are trying to break into a facility, so they're walking up to a facility and throw bricks through the back of the window. Do I just press this? Right, there you go. Okay, there you go. Is it working now? Anyone online, you can hover over the picture. Yeah, if you send us the link, we'll send it out because it was working for a second, but now it's not. It is working. Just everyone online right now, you can hover over the picture and then the play button on the left corner. Underneath that, yeah. So you can see it. Let's proceed with the presentation so we don't lose time. So as far as the emerging trends in cargo crime that we've seen from our perspective, you know, we have done something on fictitious pickup. This is mainly relating to online thefts, not burglaries and smash and grabs and what have you. But online trends have kind of taken a different role. They have emerged and formed different ways of stealing goods and stealing identities. We have done a fictitious pickup previously. There's double brokerage, and there's two types that we are going to describe in this presentation. There's combing of loads, which is becoming a major problem and headache for shippers, consignees, and underwriters. And also a T-Check scam that Jeff has taken a very active role, not only with local, but also through law enforcement, which we'll go over and describe in some detail. So first one is fictitious pickup. We'll breeze through this because most people participating here hopefully know about fictitious pickup by this time. You know, the internet load boards came online in 2003. eBay and Amazon had come online in 1995. As soon as we went internet drug brokerage, perpetrators and rogue elements started stealing identities of people just like your personal identities are risky and we get fearful and we have to protect those. Company identities were stolen. They represent themselves as ABC Trucking when they were not. They spoofed the numbers. They changed the emails very slightly so you didn't make out the difference. And they'd come and pick up your load and they'd disappear. That was fictitious pickup then. It has now evolved because we've understood the game. Law enforcement has understood the game. So the perpetrators have evolved. One of the types of double brokerage that existed was, and still exists, is that the perpetrator will take the load from the broker. So when it's put online, they will apply for the load. They will get the load awarded to them. But instead of going themselves and presenting a false driver's ID and a stolen equipment to pick up the load, they would double broker it to a legitimate one-man, two-man operator in the area of the pickup. And instead of taking it, let's say the load's going from Los Angeles to Chicago, instead of picking up the load in Los Angeles, that subcontracted driver would bring it to Hollywood where it would be cross docked into a different trailer because that's what the perpetrators told them to do. Hey, we've got a load for you. Go and pick it up and bring it to Hollywood. Our truck has broken down. But by the time you pick it up and bring it here, we'll be fine. And then we'll take it from there. Nobody records the trailer number. The driver who went and picked it up doesn't know who assigned him. They paid him in cash and he's gone and nobody's the wiser. And when you go to the shipper to get details, they've got only details of the actual driver who picked it up who was a legitimate driver. So it becomes a problem. The next type of double brokerage is since then, the perpetrators, let's say there's one large perpetrator, for example, in California, or there's one large perpetrator in Dallas. They have legitimately formed smaller companies of one or two man operators. So they might have 20, 30 companies registered on the FMCSA with proper MC authority. But all they do is assist the main perpetrator. So instead of appointing a trucker who is legitimate, like we described in the first type of double brokerage, they'll appoint one of their own friends who is a crook also. But online, it's not visible that those two companies are connected. So when the subcontracted trucker picks it up, he says, I don't know. Somebody called me and said pick it up. I picked it up and I delivered it. I delivered it to this area and I don't know what happened. But what our investigations in conjunction with law enforcement have shown that most of the times they are somehow connected. It might be a cousin. It might be a brother. But they are not disclosing that person. And just to piggyback on what Sam just said, like it's very key is a lot of times the legitimate broker, the freight broker, the broker of this load is totally unaware of that second leg of the brokering. And it's only usually discovered when we're going through a load and we find paperwork like a rate confirmation or something like that. And that's even exposed. Yeah. So thank you, Jeff. Co-mingling of loads. So this is, is this got anything more? No, it's good. Thanks. So this, what has happened is, I'm going to give you an example. Chicago to Los Angeles. Broker appoints a trucker. Trucker goes and picks up an FTL, full trailer load. He's supposed to dray it. He bids 3,500 or 4,000 for the job. And it's an FTL load. Instead of bringing the load down to California, he takes it to a CFS in Chicago, unloads the trailer, and maximizes the volume and weight to make sure that the FTL that he picked up may have had three-quarter full. He now fills it up and then sends it by rail. Because these people work out of their home and they don't have large companies, their equipment doesn't get relocated. They don't have to pay the driver. Their equipment doesn't go through wear and tear. And when it arrives here in Los Angeles, he has another trucker pick it up, pays him $300, $400. Then he removes the load that he had loaded in there and then delivers it in trailers that look very similar. And they do manipulation of the doors to make sure that the seals are intact and nobody is the wiser. What is happening with this, though, is that there's a breach of contract. It was supposed to go by motor truck and it's going by rail. The risks are different and underwriters are unaware of these risks. They are being lost and misdelivered. As you can imagine, once you unload and reload a cargo, if it doesn't fit, they don't care. We had a couple of times that some machinery went missing. And when we investigated, we found this is what had happened. But by the two months, by the time we get involved, the machinery is long gone. And there's damages as well. This is a major problem. It's happening a lot and it's increasing. It adds confusion in the shipment. People don't understand what's happening, particularly shippers and companies who are involved. And this has happened in more than just one way, where it's by rail and there are many companies doing it and these are all line hauls that are FTL. So we have to be very sure that shippers and companies and third-party facilities are aware of taking trailer numbers, seal numbers, VIN numbers if possible, because we know for a fact that the same trailer that loaded it is not the trailer that's delivering it. I'll hand it over to Jeff for the T-CHECK scan and I'll work together with him on a couple of slides and then he'll go through in detail with you. Go ahead. Thanks, Sam. And welcome, everybody. One thing more about what Sam's talking about on this double brokering, or I'm sorry, the co-mingling of freight, experts we deal with that are dealing with this every day say it is the single biggest problem in cargo theft today. So just keep that in mind. And on the T-CHECK scan, the subcontracting goes right into what we're talking about. And as you can see on the slide, they steal an ID. They pick up what might be from a legitimate driver and the delivery location is altered. The reason this all happens is that there's any more than what used to, when fictitious pickup used to happen, it was all about picking up a product to steal that load. Well, now the load is a means to T-CHECKS. And to keep it simple, let's say that Sam's shipping something to me from California to Pennsylvania. And I send it, then there's a broker involved that signs the load. Once that I pick up the load, I've stolen somebody's identity, then we call the broker and say, hey, we've got your consignment. Well, the broker says, it's great, fine. Well, there's a problem. Either I've got a maintenance problem with my equipment or I'm short on money. Regardless, I need money. So brokers will gladly send out what's called a T-CHECK. And once they get the T-CHECK, then that's the last contact that the broker has with that carrier. So we'll describe to you this map that you're seeing of the United States so that it's simpler to understand. So number one is Phoenix Brands is selling goods to Ace Hardware, which is number two. And Phoenix Brands appoints a truck broker, number three. The truck broker, post the load, on a load board. In this case, let's say we put Transco 360. And they then assign Scooby-Doo Trucking, who applies for the load. And Scooby-Doo Trucking says, okay, I'll pick it up. They exchange the documents and what have you. But Scooby-Doo Trucking, unbeknownst to the broker, is a perpetrator. They then, in order to get the load, Scooby-Doo Trucking, unbeknownst to the broker, is a perpetrator. They then have a fictitious company called Bugs Bunny. It's not a company. It's just on paper. So they tell Bugs Bunny, hey, we've got this load going from Phoenix Brands to Ace Hardware. And Bugs Bunny then generates paperwork and appoints Reality Trucking, which is number six. Reality Trucking is oblivious to what's going on, goes and picks up the load from Phoenix Brands. He then sends the bill of lading showing that he has picked up the load to Bugs Bunny, who shares it with Scooby-Doo. Scooby-Doo then tells their operator, DACME, number seven, hey, I'm going to get you a T-check. And goes back to the broker saying, here's the bill of lading. We've picked up the load. We need a T-check. And the broker sends them a T-check, let's say $1,500. That goes to DACME. DACME caches the check and they stop all contacts with Reality Trucking and with the broker. Reality Trucking, poor guys, they're a legitimate trucker. They're held with the load. They don't know what to do. So they do one of many things. They don't know who the real broker is. They have no idea because Scooby-Doo and Bugs Bunny are not getting in touch with them. So they can either take the load to Ace Hardware and deliver it, which rarely happens. They'll abandon the load thinking, hey, I got a bad deal, a bum deal, so I'll abandon the load. Why should I lose more money than I've already lost? Or they'll track down the real broker and they'll hold the load hostage and tell them, I need to be paid. They've already paid, but now they have to double pay. And then, by then, if it's gone out of the chain of custody and you've got name brands involved, then the name brand wants to destroy the goods if it's out of the chain of custody. So there's all sorts of things that come in. What Jeff will describe to you on the opposite side of it is why this flies under the radar. And the whole point of this entire exercise, the freight is just means to cash. Means to cash. Now, you may think $1,500 is nothing. Why are they doing it? But if they do 10 of them in 10 states every day and it flies under the radar because nobody wants to investigate $1,500, this is a better scam than cargo theft because cargo theft, people are looking for it. This, nobody's looking for it. And this flies up on your screen now, just a couple examples of some contracts. But the reason this flies under the radar so much is these guys are, you have to remember, these guys are thieves, but they're also truckers. They're very, very smart people. Oh, I'm sorry. I said these guys are also, they're very, very smart people, they're also cargo thieves, but the reason this flies into the radar is because it's multi-jurisdictional. You might have a trucker that calls for a T-check when he's in the state of Georgia, so he gets $1,400 there. He might need money again when he's in Arizona, he gets another $700, and this goes on throughout the country. Well, when you look at it individually, it's not much money, and law enforcement is reluctant to get involved because the dollar amounts are so low, is A, and B, they're very smart. They know where the felony thresholds are limited to. Like in Georgia, I think $1,400 is limited to a misdemeanor. So, if it's under that figure, law enforcement's not going to get involved. But when you start looking at it on a cumulative basis, it could become thousands upon thousands of dollars. Plus, the issue runs, it's hard to get law enforcement involved because it's multi-jurisdictional. You might have 15 offenses of T-check scam for one company, but they're spread out in 12 different states. It's very, very hard to get all those jurisdictions to work together. Right there, you're just looking at the, what's the MO for comm check fraud. As I just said, perpetrators search for cross-country loads with large fuel advances. If you're going to cross-country load, hence, you're going to need more money for fuel. Preferred days are Friday, just because it will lax us and get us involved on weekends. Come on. Smooth phone numbers and IP addresses are part of the game. It's what, that's how they communicate back and forth. Like I said, it occurs in various states across the country. They use outside operators to cash the fraud and acquired comm checks. We've had people that do nothing but that, because they want to, the real perpetrators want to stay invisible. So, they'll use agents to go and cash the checks, because once you have the code to a comm check, anybody can cash it. And when they cash it, excuse me, Jeff, the reason they're using operatives is so that if the law enforcement catches these operatives, they still can't get to the actual perpetrator. Well, I think this is Curtis here. On an interesting note, Jeff and I recently worked a case where, for approximately four months, the perpetrator really reeled in the truck driver. And then, once that truck driver, he'd stolen another truck driver's identity, utilizing that. He then, towards the end, said, hey, I've got this massive load. I know I don't need all these drivers. And then, had 10, 12 trucking companies. They all need T-checks. He cashes in on the T-checks, and he's gone on the comm check scam. Yeah. And Curtis, as a matter of fact, that's a huge case that we've worked on that's actually continuing. There's a, this here is actually of an agent that actually cashed a T-check in trucks up in north Las Vegas. And now, to close out that part, the Las Vegas part of, we had so many T-checks that kept showing up with one name, over and over and over again. We got copies of checks. So finally, working in units with law enforcement, I flew to Las Vegas and found this guy that the checks were made out to. When I found him, I just simply asked, are you a good guy or a bad guy? Meaning, one of two things. Either he said his identity's stolen, and they're using his identity to cash the checks, or he's a lowly participant. Well, he was very cooperative. He was pretty scared because he had a background in the criminal justice system. He was pretty scared because he had a background of some problems with being arrested and incarceration. So he was very cooperative and told us the whole scam. And it fit right in with what we had already knew. He just confirmed it and identified all the players and led us to a successful resolution of that case. So actually, Curtis and Jeff are currently working on a few cases, which we can't delve into, obviously. But they are making some good headway. So we'll go through these maps and charts, which provide good understanding of where the thefts are happening. And this is courtesy of CensyGuard, as you can see. Now, the next slide tells you which are the states that are worst affected, which is pretty obvious. The next one gives you by the commodities and patents that are being stolen. The next one tells you by the month. You know, obviously, just before Christmas holidays, things go up. And by February, they go broke, I guess. So they have to steal again. So these charts are always helpful in predicting what's going to happen and so on and so forth. The next one gives you product and values. The next one gives you the day of the week. Jeff just mentioned the Friday and Thursday. And I'm sure by this time, everyone knows that in the fictitious pickup or online deception, you have people who want to pick it up on Thursday and Friday, so it allows them to get away by the time insurance companies and brokers find out about the load on Monday not being delivered. It's too late already. So this is, again, by product type, different type of presentation. Next is by event. So the full truckload, as you can see, is the major target here. The pilferage, hijacking, fictitious pickup is also part of that. Fictitious pickup is usually full truckload and facility theft, but this is, you know, what we're dealing here is mainly of the full truckload thefts and online thefts and what have you. The one that we talked about, co-mingling, is less than truckload because that's consolidations. This is just to show Canada because we are starting to infiltrate this and affect the Canadians, and there's Toronto and Mississauga, which is a big hotbed for this type of problem. And that is their products that are stolen. Food and drinks are the biggest out there. Yeah. And also on these charts and all this information, we want to thank our good friends at CensorGuard and also CargoNet, which is a Verisec company for providing a lot of information. Yeah. Thank you, folks. So we put some vetting practices, which are pretty standard in the industry. You can get more stringent than this, but our friends in the industry have shared this with us, so we wanted to just run through them. You know, the operating authority that you see on FMCSA, the MCS form is updated every two years. And if it's a new MCS form, it still shows you the date it was issued. Most companies do 60 to 90 days. The stricter brokers use six months even. So if it's less than six months, it's just like your passport. If you've got 30 days left on your passport, some countries won't allow you to enter. So it's a safeguard. So verify their tax ID, employer ID, social security number if you're dealing with a small group or one individual. Make sure you have all your executed contracts. So you have the MC authority. You have the certificate of insurance. You have the broker-carrier agreement. You have all that well-executed. The minimum carrier qualifications approved certificate of insurance. Acceptable safety ratings. There are many sites that can help with that. Affiliation searches as to who they are affiliated. Review freight guard and TIA watchdog reports, et cetera. This is, you know, vetting has taken on a whole different phase with online tests and fictitious pickups and what have you so that we've had to learn and everybody's got to get up to speed. If you're not, you're going to get hit for sure. It's just a matter of when. Additional steps, you can call in, request shipment from the carrier. Request that the shipment is from the carrier and call, look at SAFER, that is FMCSA, and make sure that the numbers you're getting are actual numbers and not pay-as-you-go phone numbers or spoof numbers or what have you. So make sure that you're getting the right, you're talking to the right people. If FMCSA, again, the MCS 150 form has been recently changed, scammers can go in and actually alter the numbers and alter the dates and so on and so forth. So be wary of that. And again, we talked about phone numbers, email addresses and what have you. Be very careful and make sure you check with FMCSA and SAFER. Although sometimes that we address double brokering, that people give it to their own small companies or own brothers and cousins who have smaller companies and work in conjunction with each other, then it's difficult to do. But you've got other vetting processes that we talked about that can be used. And just be aware that with SAFER and FMCSA, great organization, but their emphasis is totally on compliance and safety. But a lot of people use them as sometimes a sole vetting tool. Those are great sources. Be very, just be very aware of what they actually are. Yeah. The other thing we've seen is the freight companies are very well aware, you know, third-party logistics are well aware of checking VIN numbers, equipment, driver IDs and what have you. But when you have large shippers and companies, they manufacture products. They don't check all the credentials. So if a driver comes up to them and say, I'm picking up some of your copiers and taking them to Rochester, New York, well, they say, oh, yeah, get to door number three and we'll load you up. They don't have a suspicious mind. So let the shipper know that today's days are different. You need to check these items and give them a checklist. Tell the shipper if a different carrier shows up than the one we've given you, call us immediately. Do not load them, you know. So those are some practices that can be taken operationally rather than just documented, by documents. If someone calls in and starting to make inquiries, be very wary because that's double, triple, brokered person and they should know. You know, if you appointed a carrier, they should know the pickup number. They should know where they're picking up, where they're dropping off and all that. So if somebody calls up and is fishing for that information, be very wary. Don't pass on the information. Let them find out on their own. Jeff, you want to get into ELDs a little bit? We just want to introduce this to you because this has become mandatory as of December 2017. There's two years to enact that for compliance. What it is, it's electronic log data. And it's introduced by FMCSA and this has become mandatory now. And it connects, it gives you, it's electronic logging, connects to the engine module and internet and gives you the hours and service. It's meant, again, like Jeff said, for safety. Because there are certain driving hours, there are certain deviations. You know, you've got the geodata where you cannot divert from the route, et cetera. So for that, it gives you good monitoring. Yeah. It's a service and performance safety tool, like we said. But it does overlap into security. So we can take advantage from it, but it's not going to give us foolproof security. So it ensures driver compliance, driver safety, ability to track. So every shipment by motor truck can be tracked because ELD is now mandatory. It improves driver retention and recruitment. Again, for trucking companies. And so the, again, they're talking about how it saves lives and so on and so forth. But drivers do make a complaint on this. The driver's positions are a little bit varied. They say that this will probably make them less safe. So let's say, for instance, a driver picks up a load and he's supposed to, when he rests, he's supposed to take mandatory so many hours of rest. But if he takes a load and he hits a traffic jam in two hours and he pulls over, then that mandatory field kind of checks in, and the driver's flexibility may be lost. That's what they're complaining about here, that drivers may be forced to drive when they're tired and fatigued, in a rush to meet delivery demands, may have to drive fast, and so on and so forth. So to every good thing, there is an argument on the opposite side. So we're just presenting it to you so that you're aware on both sides as to how ELDs are going to affect us. This is, again, the driver complaints of what might or might not happen with their schedules and how they will get affected on their log books and drive times and what have you. This is more of the same. It's good reading material, and you can always refer back to FMCSA and check the site, and it describes it very well. And can the, can ELD be used as a reliant, reliable security thing? Well, with caution, yes and no. They can be hacked, so be very careful in solely relying on ELDs. So it's not, you know, they haven't, there's nothing to follow cyber security practice. It's not foolproof, right. Thank you, Curtis. This is the data log that it shows up, just as an example, on a typical ELD. Potential uses for cargo theft investigations, like we said. Of course, the problem is now, if perpetrators steal the load and they know ELDs are now mandatory, they're going to destroy the tractor because they don't want to know where they took the load. So that's another downside to it. And then, of course, there's a lot of other things that you can do to protect yourself So that's another downside to it. And then, another thing we wanted to just introduce you to this new technology is these load verification apps. They're free. You can download them, or you can find folks at ShadowTrack, good friends of ours have this one here. What it does, it, at the time of the load, the pickup of a consignment, there you can take photos of the load. You can actually program this to various modes. But you can take a picture of the seal, take a picture of the equipment, the documentation, electronic, the signature, all these things are possible. And then, once you have that all, plus you've got the GPS capabilities. Once you've got all that data loaded, then you just can send that to whomever you want to on the other end and share it. Yeah, we're going through very fast, and apologies, but because there are a lot of new developments and new items that have come up, we thought it's important to tell everyone they're on the slide so you can always go back and review them later on. And this is another app that's called the Truck Sync by Babco, other friends of ours. It's the same thing, it's just that there's a few variations. I think this one has some additional adaptability, but it's all to just get the, the biggest problem I have with this, just kind of in closing, is that, is getting the guys on the, that send the shipping to actually use these apps. You know, there's a guy actually loading your load going to take the time and then use that. And what's easier, it's electronic, that's, that's, the implementation might be an issue. It provides tracking, seal verifications, and what have you, and these are now being introduced into the market. So they're good tools to use. Get into the case study and hand it over to our colleague Curtis Alfury. Thank you, folks, and thanks for all attending. This is wonderful, Jeff, Sam, appreciate everything so far. I'm just going to talk about a case of theft of frozen beef in Central America that happened. We, we got an assignment that a container had been opened. Here you can see Puerto Limon, and there's a, another port right next door called Puerto Moin. This is Puerto Moin, where it was offloaded and was at a holding facility. And the interesting thing was there was GPS on this particular container. So the urgency that Sam and Jeff had was for me to go down there and get everything I could. The container of frozen beef was being shipped from Corpus Christi, Texas, as you can see, to Alahuaca, Costa Rica, and when they opened it up, there was gravel inside. The original seal had been replaced. So when I got down there, here's one of my pictures of the gravel that was inside. We immediately knew that the gravel in that container was put there for a reason. It wasn't just gravel. It was there, obviously, so that it could cross over some scales and deceive those people that were looking at, at the weights. A lot went into this investigation. We obtained the reefer download and confirmed that the container had actually been breached in Costa Rica. The holding facility where it was at the Port of Moin, we were able to determine exactly the space where it was. The officials would not let me in. So one of the important parts of this investigation was that we got a close relationship with the Port Authority and the, and the Federal Police. The Federal Police helped me, as you can see the officer here, sealing that container. While that officer was doing that, after we gained a relationship, we were able to get additional information off the download. With that, we went to the holding facility at the Port of Moin. You'll notice the gravel in the distance. We took a sample of the gravel out of the container and a sample of the gravel at the original facility that was offloaded. And from there, we did a, a comparative here in the United States. And a sample of the gravel from the container was compared at an aggregate laboratory and it was a perfect match by both aggregates. So this was something that we found that was very important to have a close relationship with the port authority who introduced us to law enforcement and the original facility was not going to let me in at all but when the three officers showed up and said we will shut your facility down for the day they quickly let us come in. The result was the same ship line was held responsible for the breach that occurred while the container was under their care custody and control. The irony in this was Curtis's previous life he had worked in aggregate business and he said when he saw gravel in this container he said let me handle this I know how to do it and he went and tracked down that gravel I think that was ingenious because by the time he found the other gravel and then he compared the two samples and he get it to a lab I mean then it's the DNA has been matched and that was great because because with that the sub row becomes that much more smoother. I think the amazing thing in this particular case just wrapping up is that Costa Rica doesn't let you travel with two five-gallon buckets of gravel but the Costa Rican custom authorities and work with the federal police allowed us to ship the gravel back here to the United States for analysis and it worked out great. The next case is a case I worked up in Seattle, Washington. Don't get confused the next two cases are both up in the Seattle area. One's in Sumner, Washington the other one's in Linwood both in the Seattle area. Normally these are not this is not an area of high cargo theft crimes just we had two very high-profile cases up in that area here recently. This one here involved a shipment of five and a half, I'm going to let Sam go through this because we worked on this together, but this is involved of over five million dollar shipment of iPhones that was going from Seattle, Washington to Newcastle with the final destination in Dubai. A little bit of preamble here so in any investigation you have to understand the motive and the reasons and so on and so forth. Once you get a grasp on why they're doing it and the motive behind it, follow the money and what-have-you, then it becomes easier to concentrate on the right part of the investigation than the wrong part of the investigation. We couldn't will figure out why somebody would sell gray market iPhones. I mean you go to an iPhone you go to Apple the phone is available the same price at Best Buy then it is an Apple then a Circuit City then any other any other retailer. So why would one do that? And we couldn't for the life of us understand why he's sending these iPhones in this bulk quantity to Dubai. I mean the key thing about this, Sam's exactly right, but these are older model iPhones like when the 7s up these were 5s and 5s. Yeah 5s and 5s and some 4s. We couldn't figure it out. This guy kept telling us it's radio frequency. The claimant, the perpetrator, it's the radio frequency. Little does he know that as a ship captain I did pieces on radio frequencies right. I know it's not radio frequencies but I just bought what he had to say and then a colleague of ours told us it's the FaceTime because they do not introduce FaceTime on phones in the Persian Gulf and that's why the US and European phones are so popular with FaceTime included. So once we knew that we knew that there was a gray market trade for this sort of thing. This is the individual's parents' residence where he says he packed the phones in his garage and there were 116 cartons and this is when he loaded the cartons into a U-Haul truck and he packed the cartons himself and this is this is the close-up of the bags. Now these look like Apple bags but if you look at those red circles and the M marking over there and we found that if you look at the strings, the drawstrings, they are much longer than an Apple bag. So we figured out that these were made to look like Apple bags or wannabes. Yeah so so we knew that he was trying to fool us but we still didn't have any proof to to nail him. The other thing that struck us as odd was that the shipment was sent by a parcel post by FedEx and he could have easily sent an LTL or FTL shipment cross-country because he was sending it from here to the East Coast and then the East Coast folks were sending it to Dubai. Why would he spend $60,000 to send 116 cartons via FedEx when he could send it by motor truck for $5,000 and the difference in arrival was one day. Couldn't understand. This caused us to think a lot. It was a red flag for us. So we we asked him can you show us some photos and can you give us some more information as to what when you pack them and what have you and then we are very sitting here assisting us with this presentation. He is a forensic IT genius. He took those photographs that we got and he researched the internet and by metadata he found that the photographs that this individual was giving us were two or three years ago. One was taken in Australia, one was you know taken somewhere else and these were all existing photographs. These were not the stuff that he packed. They were stock internet photos. Stock internet photos. Thank you Jeff. So then we wanted to find out if he ever had the iPhones and when we started to investigate him online we found out he had a claim history and he was a sort of a claim artist and once we knew that we knew he was a bad guy. We knew the motives. We knew what was going on and he also had a bank loan that he was trying to satisfy. I think it was a three million dollar bank loan. So we knew that he might be doing this in order to satisfy the bank loan so he doesn't get in trouble there. As the investigation progressed what this guy did is he gave it to FedEx in Seattle then he monitored the shipments and he knows shipping practices. So he declared the weight as let's say 52 pounds or 55 pounds and he knew that FedEx will just accept his weight but then FedEx sends it to Memphis where they actually weigh the cartons and they put the correct weight of the cartons. Once he saw that correct weight come up on their computer he complained to FedEx oh my weights have changed I was just checking my progress of my shipment and the weights have changed and he alleged that hey somebody has gotten into my cartons. So FedEx didn't know any better. They didn't know what had happened. They said well he's got a legitimate complaint. He declared it at 52 pounds now they are showing at 60 or 61 pounds. So he flew to destination and wanted to open them and he opened some of them and he said oh look we've got concrete bricks. Somebody took out my phones and put concrete bricks in there. Now when we started to investigate this it was a few weeks down the road FedEx would not cooperate with us because they have a 5.7 million dollar claim against them. But through Detective Mark Zavala who's an industry associate this is his last day as it as it happens he has been 35 years in the industry thanks to Mark. He introduced us to a FedEx investigator who we got great cooperation from who sent us photographs. So when they sent us these photographs we contacted our industry associates in the Seattle area and found out that these were specialized pumice bricks which were lighter than general concrete bricks and only one store sold them in Seattle. That's where the perpetrator lived and the map below it shows the claimants residence on the left and mutual materials on the right. As a ruse we went and saw the claimant. He took us to Home Depot which everybody on the slide can see is slightly south of mutual materials and he said look these are not the bricks I don't know where they got the bricks from. But by this time we had already been to mutual materials and found out that they sell the same pumice bricks and they are the only ones who sell it. With law enforcement help we were able to get the copy. He signed for the bricks himself on the day he packed the shipment. This is a smoking gun. This was the smoking gun. So when we got that we presented it yeah we found out other losses that he had filed claims with Apple. We went with and met with Apple and Cupertino explained the situation to them. They were very gracious and very welcoming and they were pleased with our investigation and that was the end of that. Insurers were happy with the result. In the event you think you might be living your life wrong, this guy was a 26 year old University of Washington business graduate that had an 11 million dollar penthouse condo in Bellevue which a few people know Seattle is like the Hollywood of LA or Beverly Hills of LA. He had three different Ferraris a red one, a white one, and a blue one. Plus he had the top-of-the-line Mercedes SUV, had the suites at the Seattle University Seahawks, the University of Washington. In other words he did done quite well. Yeah his neighbor was Russell Winsome. That's right the quarterback of the Seahawks. Moving on the other case that we've had up there in summer Washington involved some theft of electronics and clothing from a 4PL. We were called because we had a history up there working. The law enforcement people knew us. Of course we had a client that was a very aware of us and when this happened they called for our immediate assistance to go up there. As soon as I got up there I had a strong indication who was involved. It's a very probably most prolific organized crime cargo theft group on the West Coast. We had a meeting with the task force up there that great guys become great friends but knew very little about cargo theft. They mostly was dealing with tweakers and stealed Honda cars. So we got together and I told them who I thought was involved. There was a nearby truck stop that was very close to the lost site. I said I'd be shocked if these guys weren't in there used as a base of operations. So we had one of the detectives go there the following day. Bingo. When he went inside all of our suspects I told him about were actually there. That site Sam just shows is the yard. Here's what they did. They broke in before they made the theft. They marked nine different combinations containing FCLs and FTLs with this different types of markings. The good part about this was law enforcement in Seattle wasn't familiar with this perpetrator but Jeff was familiar with their signs. So when he saw the XO sign he knew exactly who was involved in the theft. These next photos are just showing how the yard was breached. They parked there in that parking lot that you're seeing in the background. That's where they parked their car and in the nighttime just walked across that field and breached the yard. And then once they were ready to leave you can see that to get the trucks in actually there's K-Line and the fence which actually is literally knocked down. They were going to take as I said nine different FCLs and FTLs but they had an in-yard accident that this crashed so they only had to stop and only get out five. Here's pictures about the product on the right, some of the electronics on the left, some of the clothing items from Ross. Here's our suspects, the kingpin being the fellow in the middle who his name is Mario Alvarez, he goes by Cuco. Interestingly enough the guy who's left named Nacho was just recently arrested on another case we had where we had Xboxes stolen from the ports of LA Long Beach and we recovered the 8,000 were stolen, we got back 4,000 units. The guy on the left, Nacho, his lieutenant was actually charged and arrested. In any of our theft investigations, this is before we made the recoveries, what's normal is you know since there were five different FCLs taken then what we do is we start we go and we start recovering the stolen equipment and look for leads. If anyone has a dog you can see it's raining in Seattle. What this led us to, I think about four days into the case, I think I was up there for nine days, we got a just luck, we got we're all getting ready to go out on a recovery site and we get a phone call that had been a woman that had witnessed, it was highly unusual that there had been five or six Latino fellows in a yellow Penske truck that was offloading Best Buy product into a private storage facility or public storage facility and she said, I didn't realize that Best Buy used public storage for overstock. So once we got that, we went to that facility, we got all the background on who had rented the facility and once you, luckily the adjacent storage unit was vacant so we got access to it and when you go up to the top, there's about a 12-inch gap, the walls don't go over the ceiling. So one of the detectives who's quite tall, he restored this camera, took a photo and bingo, it was floor to ceiling with Best Buy product. Once we did that, we did electronic surveillance of that unit, found a car, put tracking devices on it and actually tried, you know, gather intel on the suspects. Which what finally led to the recovery, full recovery of all the product. This is the storage facility that the product was in and then we also called them to a warehouse and we found them. You can see that how much goods they had that were actually inside the warehouse. So between the two, like I said, we made a recovery. Kuko was arrested, unfortunately. We were trying to get a terrorist hold on him through ice but he has a very, very crafty bail bondsman who he was able to bond out before we get the information in. So and then the next case I want to talk about real quick is an interesting case of a Nigerian scam in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. What this involved is the PO's for a lot of these public institutions are available online, a blank PO. These guys, very savvy, very computer savvy guys, had actually went online and got a blank PO. Now they also had some information that they knew the University of Pennsylvania was a customer of this supplier. So they filled out the PO and then sent it to a supplier that does, that manufactures diagnostic computers in Hercules, California. Well they see the PO, they fill it and we've got an example of there on the left is the, is the PO. There's also a commercial invoice. Well once the, the supplier gets the PO, they fill it and they've been supplied with information to send it to the University of Pennsylvania. However, the information of the shipping is just slightly off. It is University of Pennsylvania, it is on the same street but the address numerically is a little bit off. So once the driver is trying to execute the delivery, he notices this isn't right. So he calls a telephone number supplied on the invoice, which is an IPO number being monitored by the bad guys. So as soon as they get the call, they said, oh yeah, we don't want that taken there, we want this to a different venue. Rather than taking it to the University of Pennsylvania campus, we need this taken to a warehouse in Trenton, New Jersey, which now we have a photo there that was just a very nondescript warehouse. So when I was there, I did an investigation with the detective with the University. So yeah, we're aware of this, we get hit all the time, the FBI is aware of it. So I leave with the FBI and they had a substantial amount of information on these people. The one thing they didn't have, they were aware of how the the delivery sites have changed, but they'd never been to this warehouse in New Jersey. And I said, what'd you find out when you went there? Is this guy a good guy or bad guy? They go, we don't know, we've never been there. So I went down and met this guy. What I did, he told me exactly what was going on. He said, man, I've been waiting for you to come. I said, why is that? He said, well I know something's not right because I've been getting these shipments will just show up. The guy only communicates to me electronically. He sends the shipping labels. I said, are you getting paid? He said, oh yeah, the guy always pays me. He said, I know there's something wrong, it's because if there were weight variations, he would say, oh don't worry about that, the DHL would take care of it, which just doesn't work that way. We got very lucky at the time when I was there. He goes, by the way, this guy just contacted me electronically. He answered about another shipment we should be getting within days. I said, so you've got a direct line of communication with this guy? He said, yes. So as you can see, our bad guy is this guy named Bravo Lee. That's his signature information. I went to check that out, it was in Philadelphia. That's an office building in downtown Philadelphia. They've never heard of this guy. He's never leased any property there. So what we tried to do, this map here just kind of shows you where, geographically, the proximity of events. What we tried to do was to substitute a product, I think in this particular product there was some more diagnostic equipment, and what we found out that every shipment that went through this warehouse would always be going to the United Kingdom. Well what I wanted to do was put a track to substitute the goods at a similar weight, put a track device in it. I even called the FBI and talked to them about it. I thought it was a great idea. They go, what are you trying to prove? I said, because we know this has been going on for a period of time. But what we've never really been able to discover, we always knew it would end up in Nigeria. I said, if we had a track device, it would extend the breadcrumb trail farther than we've ever went before. They go, yeah, that'd be true. But what we found out when we started getting into this, we would become the bad guys for a couple of reasons. Number one, through customs, if we're substituting freight that's not accurate and it's discovered, we're the ones that are committing fraud. The other issue comes in, if you have a tracking device that goes into foreign countries, without their permission, we could be charged with espionage. So we massaged this thing, went back and forth with federal officials as much as we could, and to make a long story short, it was a good plan but never was instituted. But still, it's a very, very interesting scam that goes on. I think that at the time, I think there had been over five million dollars of theft involving 85 companies and over 200 universities that have been victim of these guys. So with that, we're ready for questions and answers. Thank you for your attention and ask away. Moderator? Sorry, I'll bring up the Q&A pod right now. OK. So here we have the Q&A pod. If there are any questions, you can type your question into the Q&A pod for our presenters and hit the Enter key or the balloon icon, which I think I just made that jump away, didn't I? I'll go back again. There we go. So again, if you have any questions, I'm sorry about making it disappear. Just type it in and hit the balloon icon or the Send Enter key on your keyboard. So we have our first question. What's the cost of GPS trackers, and are they effective? Very good question. The question is, what is the cost of GPS trackers, and are they effective? Because only the presenters see the question, so we do want to read them to you. It's an excellent and very timely question. And yes, a lot of changes have occurred in that field. It has actually become very, very inexpensive, and it's also become very, very accurate. The only issue that comes up is you have, how many trailers are you tracking? But for individuals, it's dropped drastically in cost. And like I said, it's very, very effective. I think we, just to give you an example, you can get a very, very small device that's very accurate and can maybe cost you like $250. And that's for like 90 days. It's even kind of, there's a loss policy in there that even if you can't recover it, that's included in the cost. So it becomes very, very cost effective anymore. And like I said, we've used some on a case here in LA. Extremely accurate. Extremely accurate. And it's real time. There's various ways to track. You get breadcrumb trails. You get trends. It's great to. Geofencing. Geofencing, exactly. So there's another question. Yes. This next question is, do you find that when truckers are holding loads hostage that the logistics companies are paying the ransom? That's a very good question and very topical. In the past, the reason a lot of hostage loads would happen, there might be a lot for a while. I think we've handled a number, I think about maybe only two of them we haven't been able to resolve. But yet, we get, we might not be able to resolve how we would like for it to, but it still gets resolved satisfactorily. What has traditionally happened, like a good example is when Sandy hit. You've got truckers that get assigned a load, but they could not get into the New York or the Eastern Seaboard and they had to spend a certain amount of days in, say, Pennsylvania. Well, they had a rate confirmation agreement for X amount of dollars to procure, to deliver that load. Well, the driver goes, well, hey. You know, I had to sit there. I'm losing money. So then that's where the disagreement comes in. And so the driver feels his only recourse is to hold the freight hostage. And the question asked was correct. You know, if it is a large company, let's just say a brand-name company that is shipping some stuff, they hold the logistics company's feet to the fire. That, you know, we gave it to you. It's your responsibility, and there is no grace over there. So the logistics companies, in order to keep the business unfortunately do take the hit many a times, if the load is recovered and it's not a food item and they're able to reuse the load, then the damage is small. But if it's a food item and they choose destroying the freight, which we see a lot of times, even though the cartons haven't been touched, they want to destroy the freight, then the logistics company gets into a real bind because the insurance company may not take into that. But on the majority of the cases we've had, it usually gets resolved because of our great relationship throughout the United States and also Canada with law enforcement. A lot of times what we have to do is prove our case that we're the good guys in this, that everything's been done with copious documentation, take that to law enforcement, and then they go there at the badge, show them what's going on. A lot of times the freight gets released just based on that. Thank you. And the next question is pertaining to electric logging devices. Can they be used remotely and in real time? Absolutely, yeah. Jeff, you've seen a lot of them, right? Yes, you can monitor it on your computer, on your laptop in real time. The alerts are as you want to set the alerts. You know, it will not just automatically, you can set the alert so that they automatically let you know if it's gone five miles out of the geographic zone that you've set for it. Geofencing. You can set it, you get an alert every time it stops and starts and, you know, so on and so forth. So that alerts are based on how you want to set it up. And also, just to keep in mind, there's a lot of information, and I want to thank Carbonet, they're the ones that gave us information on the ELD. But there's exceptions. Like I think any tractor that's manufactured before 1999 can exempt out of this. So it's only going to be on newer equipment. But there's other exemptions, too, that you can actually go to the website and read about. But it's new technology, and like I said, it's going to be implemented over the next two years, starting this past December. I want to take a moment to say hi to our friend Sharon. This is Curtis's question. And that leads to the next question. Regarding the ground beef shipment, how were the perpetrators able to remove the product and fill the container with tons of gravel with no one seeing them? Yeah, this was really interesting. Because we had the GPS information, we knew when, it's not how long, we just knew when and where. So we knew how long it took to read, to get back to the temperature set. So we looked at those times. It took 17 hours for it to get back down. When you subtract those 17 hours, you realize that this took place in the middle of the night. There's a rear gate to this port facility, and what they had done is they used a skip loader that had a scale on it that we found when myself and the law enforcement were walking. I climbed up on some pallets and looked in a window and saw a skip loader. We believe that that particular company knew that they had employees that had gone rogue and didn't want the liability. So the skip loader was hidden, but when we matched the gravel, they couldn't get out of it. The security guards at the rear gate were involved, and the folks who stole the beef probably gave them a cut of it. And Curtis had actually got many other photographs where he saw lines and indentations along the inner skin of the container where the skip loader had rubbed up against it. So he took close-up pictures of that, and there was a yellow paint on that, paint transfer. So when he found the skip loader, yeah, we matched the paint and realized that was the skip loader that was used, and that particular skip loader had a scale on it. And again, the gravel was just the deception to get by the scale so that they could log it. But in reality, most of the employees in the middle of the night at that back portion of the facility were involved. Thank you. Next question. Do you find that criminal brokers, like Scooby-Doo Trucking in your example, are going back to the same logistics company over and over, or do they switch between brokers? And the second part of that question. Very good question. Great question. It's probably one we all want to jump on at the same time. Yes, is the answer to your question. As a matter of fact, we just got a case in yesterday involving this exact thing that Curtis is working on. Yes, they do. By the way, I'm offended that Looney Tunes and Scooby-Doo were used as examples in a couple of my favorite cartoons. And another part of that question is, wouldn't the brokers eventually stop giving them loads? Yes, but... When they change their company name or their fictitious identity, the broker is... It's very difficult for the broker to know that they're giving it to the same perpetrator. And also, it's just come to light here recently, there's so much that goes on that on... Another thing that is kind of an issue in this, in the past we've had, and I don't mean to be disrespectful to law enforcement, I love it, we've got the greatest contacts in the world with law enforcement. However, we've had problems with this type of, of these types of thefts that were brokers, because what happens is, sometimes it doesn't meet a financial threshold to get federal authorities involved, which you need federal authorities, because it's multi-jurisdictional across many states. We had a case done in Georgia where we had thefts amounting to over $250,000. We took the federal prosecutor, he said, what do you want me to do with it? We're like, well, Jesus, who are we supposed to turn to? Walmart? I mean, it's law enforcement. But I understand his point of view, he goes, look, we have X amount of dollars threshold for cases, but $250,000 just simply doesn't meet that threshold. Well, we've done, we're very, very resilient. What we've done as a result of that, in the case that we've got currently going on, is we have gotten the USDOT investigators, which have the same federal badge authority that an FBI or Secret Service or DE agent has, get involved and they understand this. With that, they've unified with the Secret Service and some other federal authorities, because of the case, Homeland Security involves Ohio, involves California. So now we've got federal authorities working on this case, all with the same goal, we're still working it, we're going to push the ball forward, doing a lot of legwork, feeding them information, they're compiling it, and they're going to build a very, very, very large case against these folks. Thank you. We have a couple more questions. With regard to reefer containers, how long do you have before you lose the information as to the temperatures? Well, I think the critical thing in this case was Sam's insistence that I get there quickly, because we didn't want somebody else to download that information and then delete it. And I'll let Sam talk about the timeframe. Usually, Claire, that information on the reefer download is there for a number of years, two, three years. It's not like CCTV camera that gets wiped out every 30 days, but it is under the control of the steamship line and sometimes they can wipe it out or they can choose what they want to do with it. It's, after all, a little memory device and microprocessor, so they control that. But usually, when there's nothing going on and there's no incident, it can remain on there for two, three years, and so it's usually available. In this instance, on that particular case, we're a little creative in that we found a guy who was leaving the facility and he was able to get the download information for us before anybody else did, so that we could have the information critical to our investigation. Okay. Okay, and then another question from Claire. Due to the amount of cargo theft, doesn't it make sense that all companies that ship goods would have some type of closed-circuit television on their docks, or is there any legislation out there that would make it a law that closed-circuit television has to be on all the docks and or shift yards? Yeah, I guess freedom comes in all sorts of prices, and without CCTV, then the jobs come to TRM. But, however, that's a very good question, and almost a no-brainer. Why wouldn't they have it? But they don't. Well, Claire, many do. We get, I think what you're talking about, a lot of companies actually will videotape and they'll show the load being loaded, and one of the last things they do is they'll have a video still of that load before the door closes. But also, this is where it comes into play that's very key. You might want to revisit those new apps. That's what these new apps are all about, to support that. And then, yeah, the new apps that Jeff briefly mentioned with the two companies. The thing is also the resolution, the time of day, the lighting, the overall quality of the video, you know, the re-recording of the CCTVs, how soon or late the claim is reported. There are so many other factors that come into play, and what do they have to do with the CCTV, Claire? If they come in with a mask and throw a towel on top of the camera and then take their mask off, there goes the CCTV. Well, interestingly enough, earlier this year we had a case where, unless you have willing participants, all they did was unload the load outside the view of the CCTV cameras and got away with an awful lot of stuff. The scope of it, the coverage scope. And also, just keep in mind, that's a very valuable tool that we use all the time, but maybe not in an area where you might not be thinking about. What we do a lot of times is contact that shipper with the load and say, hey, we need to know how, is it palletized, is the floor loaded? What's the cartons look like? How's it stacked on pallets? And we use that information to use in BOLOs, which a lot of times has helped us lead to recoveries. One of the funniest stories about that, we actually had an actual case here in Southern California where we had a notorious driver that we knew was a thief. So they put a photo of his right by the dock door. Well, when the bad guy backs up, it's this guy. So when he backs up and gets out, the dock worker goes, hey, look at that picture, it looks a lot like you. So of course, it spooks the guy, and he takes off and runs and gets away, and it's just kind of comical. Anyway. Thank you. We have one. Oh my gosh, that's a question I haven't seen before. What's that? Do you want me to read it? Do you have an opinion on how cargo theft will be impacted by automated and driverless vehicles? I have a question for our IT professional who is sitting here, the forensics genius. Is, can I program a driverless vehicle and make it come to my house instead of going where it's supposed to go? Hacking would be amazing. Hacking would be a problem, wouldn't it? Yes, also right now, okay. Hi, how are you doing? This is Barry, he's our IT genius. Well, that's too tight. No, it's not. Well, right now it's like, the easy way is because like in a, all this autonomous driving system that's being worked on right now, they have one thing they really have to work on, which is safety. It means right now, if somebody trying to stop in front of it, guess what the truck's going to do? Stop. If it's in the middle of the night somewhere, and not moving anywhere. So, they have to work on that right now. It's like with the response times and kind of stuff. So, cargo theft, will it be impacted by driverless vehicles? It could. I mean, like in the early stage, they might pull a truck in front of it in the middle of the night, the truck is programmed to stop, and then you open the cargo and take the cargo and there's no witness. That's true. I was part of a, I was asked to speak up in Microsoft's headquarters last year about trends in cargo theft relating to technology. That's one of the things that we talked about. And the thing that kept coming up over and over, we all kind of agreed upon in this area is, to simplify it, a driverless truck is going to be viewed very similar as a pilotless aircraft. It's just the public trust is going to be a very key thing. Like when people, as you well know, a computer flies a plane and lands it. There's where the pilot kind of sits there and takes controls if needed, or to land. Well, same thing will probably apply with a driverless truck, but how is the public going to say when they see a mass amount of moving metal without a driver? I mean, the driver, hell, he could be in the back of the sleeper reading a magazine while it's being driven, but still, it's going to be that public perception that's going to come in very, very key to see how that's digested by the public. I don't know if we actually answered the question, but I hope we did some part of it. There's also, there's a lot unknown. We don't have all the answers to that. I don't think anyone does. You have to see the impact of something like that. I mean, a similar question came up while I was up there, just so, FYI, is about with Amazon's growth, the way they're taking over, about the drone superhighway. A lot of issues come up. One, there's a guy that's done an extensive study in academia about it. In his opinion, it's going to be problematic because he made a very simple observation. He goes, what happens when we have a thunderstorm at major airports? What happens? Planes are grounded. They can't fly. Well, drones won't be able to fly in bad weather either. So, there's things like that that sound like great concepts. They are, but they still have some bugs that have to be worked out. Okay, thank you. That's our questions, all our questions. Sam, Jeff, and Curtis, thank you for an informative presentation. Thank you for that. Thank you, thank you. Thank you also to you, our attendees, for your participation and your interesting questions. All attendees will receive an email with a link to our electronic survey. Please take a moment to provide feedback to IMUA. And I'll also send out another copy of the PDF in a format that will be accepted. So, if you didn't receive that, we'll send that out along with the survey.

Contemporary Trends in Cargo Theft

Captain Essam Wadhwani

Jeff Hall

Curtis Salisbury

Emerging Trends in Cargo Crime

Fictitious Pickups

Double Brokerage

Technology in Cargo Security

ELDs

Load Verification Apps

GPS Tracking in Theft Prevention