Hi everyone, I'm Lillian Coulson. Welcome to the second and final day of the Transportation Forum hosted by Inland Marine Underwriters Association. Thanks again for taking time out of your schedule to join us today. I'd also like to take a moment to thank the following people or groups for making today's program possible. IMUA's Transportation Committee for developing the topics and making speaker recommendations. Our moderator, Jason Baynard with NBIS. Our presenters, whom Jason will introduce throughout today's program. And my colleagues, Kevin O'Brien, Eileen, and Ali Monreale, who have been working closely with our presenters to bring this comprehensive program to you. Before we get started, we have a couple of quick items to review. To help reduce strain on your local network, we suggest that you close all unnecessary browsers and internet-reliant programs. Each of you have an attendee control panel on your screen. Here's where you'll find all your features and the all-important question box. If you have a question or comment for today's presenters, please type in the question box and then click submit. Our moderator, Jason, will see your question and ask the presenters your question at the appropriate time. Our presenters look forward to your questions throughout the session today and each presenter will have a final Q&A at the end of their respective session, time permitting. So, we encourage you to ask lots of questions. There's also a handouts tab in your control panel where you can retrieve the PDFs of our presentations. Please be aware of the IMUA statement reminding all to refrain from entering into any discussions on matters affecting rates or conditions of insurance contracts. And with that, I am thrilled to introduce our moderator today, Jason Baynard, Vice President of Underwriting at MBIS in the Atlanta metropolitan area. He is a graduate of Clark University, at Clark Atlanta University, with over 19 years of insurance experience. Jason began his insurance career as an underwriter trainee at CHUBB. He is a member of IMUA, where he currently serves on the Transportation, Construction and Southeast Regional Advisory Committees. Additionally, he is a past IMUA On the Move podcast guest, an annual meeting presenter, Intro to Inland Marine Insurance course instructor, and Southeast Regional seminar presenter on Ricker's Liability. Welcome Jason. Thanks, Lillian. Appreciate that rollout. Excited to be here, guys. I'm really happy to take part in this two-day comprehensive program as you guys as moderator for the time. And I actually believe we're nearing 200 attendees virtually today. So, really excited for the audience and to listen to our guests. But before we get started, I wanted to mention that everybody, very important, very, very important. We'll be receiving a survey at the end of today's time. So, definitely make sure you guys give us our feedback. You know it's a very intimate space that we operate in here at IMUA and your opinion matters. So, look forward to that. As Lillian teed up, we have an extraordinary group of subject matter experts for today. And we're very excited that they've been able to take some time from their busy routines to share their thoughts and insights with us. Today, we'll be covering two transportation-related topics. One being U.S. cargo theft trend is the first session. That'll be going from now till about 2.30. After that time, we'll take a 30-minute break. And then we'll pick things up at around 3 o'clock for our second half on transit security. Now, I'm thrilled to introduce our first two presenters for the time this afternoon. We got Jeff Hall, who's the principal investigator of transit risk management, and Curtis Salisbury, an investigator, both working for transit risk management. Jeff Hall is a principal and private investigator with transit risk management, headquartered in Long Beach, California. I think he's a Trojan fan. However, based on Jeff, however, Jeff is based in Dallas, Fort Worth, Texas, and he handles cargo theft investigations exclusively throughout North America. With over 43 years as a licensed private investigator, expansive network of industry associates and broad client base comprised of insurance, trucking, logistics, and broker companies, Jeff and the transportation risk management team provide unique insight and knowledge over the ever-changing cargo theft industry that few others possess. Curtis has been involved in the investigative field for the U.S. for over 17 years in Mexico and Latin America for 35 years. He's fluent in English and Portuguese and Spanish. Mr. Salisbury is well-respected in the insurance field for recoveries in Mexico and Latin America and has been engaged in training of industry associates in the cargo theft field in the U.S. and CPAT certified. Both Curtis and Jeff are past webinar guests for IMUA. Let's give a virtual warm welcome. Welcome to Jeff and Curtis and fellas, we'll turn the floor over to you. Thank you very much and we're honored to be here. Thanks everybody for taking time out to enjoy our presentation. I think you'll get a lot out of it. Very good. Jeff, I think what we'd like to do first as we discussed, if you can kind of give an overview of where our presentation is going, then I'll grab that first slide and we'll proceed from there. Certainly. You're going to notice that much of our presentation deals with California. The reason being California is the top cargo theft venue in the United States with Texas number two. And what we've done, we've taken, there's right now there's four major organized crime groups operating throughout the United States. Three primarily in that have done most of their their thefts in California where the other one is doing theirs in the southeastern part of the country. And we're going to center on some of the thefts have done in Louisville later in the, in the presentation. So don't think there's not cargo theft in other parts of the country, but we just felt where the most prolific stuff is going on that we would center on those, those areas today. Very good. Thank you, Jeff. So I'll start out the first slide by discussing some observations made by the California Highway Patrol. California Highway Patrol has a unique group called CTIP and many of you may be aware of CTIP. They're the California Theft Interdiction Program. And these are undercover officers that are located throughout the state. And they're a wonderful asset when it comes to cargo theft resource. We engage them often. We will get a police report in a local area in California specifically. And then we will make certain that that local law enforcement is aware that CTIP will be involved and we request their involvement. Jeff recruited me to the business. Jeff is the one who introduced me to a great group of law enforcement officers. And in my work in Latin America, I basically copied the same concept Jeff has done. Jeff has law enforcement contacts throughout the United States and Canada. Jeff and I've worked some cases together down in Mexico. And when we were looking at some statistics recently with California Highway Patrol, prior to a presentation we gave last week, it was interesting to note some of the new trends that we're seeing just in the state of California that, as Jeff mentioned, will eventually affect other parts of the country. So let me go over a few of those points right now. The CTIP report on cargo theft trends in California is interesting because it points out some things that we haven't seen in the past. This has been increasing over the last five years. According to CTIP in Southern California, cargo theft by the way of armed assailants with gang affiliation is on the rise during the last five years. The reason this is so critically important is it blends right in with the work that I do in Latin America. There are 16 major cartels that operate in Mexico alone. There are two major cartels that operate in Central America. We're starting to see some of that influence come up, especially in border cities such as that Jeff deals with all the time and I deal with, Laredo, Texas, El Paso, Texas. We see border areas in Arizona. We see it in San Diego, in Campo, many of the different segments where we're seeing that influence of the cartels that work the northern area, be it the Gulf cartel to the east or the Sinaloa and cartels that have now taken over where the what was called the Arellano cartel operate, and then of course the infamous Juarez cartel. And you're seeing a lot of them join with gangs in the United States and they'll make a pre-order. So it's interesting to see that influence that going across the border. Just for all the viewers to understand, and many of you know, that there are 35,000 loads that cross the border with Mexico every single day. So the opportunity for cargo theft, for fraud, and all the different trends that are going on are influenced by both sides of the border. Common trends include the hijacking and terminal robberies as follows. We haven't seen that a lot, but in the last five years in California, as mentioned, we're starting to see a lot of that. Terminal robberies follow as organized theft groups enter a trucking facility. They'll hold the security guards and employees hostage. They'll bind them, gag them, hold them in an office building while they go and do their dirty work, and then when they're done, they will sometimes abandon them there, or at times they've even sequestered them. They'll proceed to steal one or several loaded vehicles. The other issue that's coming up is hijackings. Truck drivers come to a stop in a southern region in California. They'll stop at a signal at night, they'll stop at a truck stop, they'll go for a dinner break. Assailants will survey the targeted commercial commodity that they're looking after, they go after that rig, and they will get information regarding the transported rig. The driver stops his rig, one or several gunmen will enter the cab and detain the driver. The transport the load to a predetermined destination. In Mexico, this is a very common thing that happens. 95% of the cargo theft that goes on in Mexico is operated in this fashion. And an interesting statistic here, in the United States and Canada, Jeff, correct me on this number if I'm wrong, I believe at our last conference, in the U.S. it's about 850, and between the U.S. and Canada it was right around 1250 cargo thefts in transit occur in Canada and the U.S. The shocking statistic is that in Brazil, it's 16,000 plus. In Mexico, in 2021, it was 19,827 cargo thefts, of which 90 to 93% right in that percentile were all done by armed gunmen in this fashion. Eventually, the drivers set free a distance from the theft location, which is a quite common practice, which will be noted by today's statistics. TRM now sees these trends of armed aggressive cargo theft in SoCal. This has been a principal modus operandi in Latin America for decades. Folks, I'd like to just mention one thing before we move on to the next slide. And that is, during our presentation, because we've got certain vernaculars we use, we will identify a certain ethnicity. And that identification is really within the law enforcement community and the cargo theft community, because we understand when Jeff might mention the Cubans, it is a specific group of operators that operate in cargo theft in the Florida region. He might mention a last name that is from India, like a Singh or something like that. And when I use terminologies of a Mexican cartel, we're specifically referring to that northern region or some of the high influence cartels. In the U.S., it might be a Chicago group with an Irish last name. But in no way are we doing this to belittle someone's ethnicity or culture. What we're trying to do is use some of the terminology we're used to. So if we utilize that today, there is no offense meant. It's just how we identify certain groups when we're in a room talking. Jeff, any comments on that subject? Yeah, just to be very clear, people of all ethnicities, races, colors, creeds are involved in cargo theft. So make no mistake about that. We're just going to talk about some today that are specific groups that, as Curtis said, that law enforcement is familiar with and that anybody involved in cargo theft recognizes these groups. And also, something Curtis brought up on his points, the reason we're talking about some Mexico casework is because it's starting to influence things in the United States, whereas it hasn't for a long time. Thankfully, the armed involvement, the hijackings are starting to occur on a periodic basis. But still, the bulk of cargo theft that goes on in the United States does not involve violence. So just keep that in mind. But unfortunately, it's starting to creep its way in there. Very good. Hey, Curtis, we actually have a question here. Okay. You noted in your slide that trends are increasing of armed aggressive cargo thefts in the Southern California region. How does this compare to Latin America? Is there any relationship between Latin America and the United States regarding cargo theft? Yeah, yeah, there is. And a lot of times, and Jeff is going to talk a lot about something called targeted loads. He'll be very specific about that. I believe we have several examples of case studies that you did, Jeff, on that topic. And when you look, I'll just give an interesting example to that question. There was a cargo theft that occurred in Las Roscadas, Mexico, a Pacific Coast port. And someone was delivering something from San Luis Potosi, Mexico. And what they did is they hijacked very large transmissions, and then were able to get those down into Guatemala. What we're seeing is when the cartels, they'll make a pre-order to another affiliate gang in the United States. And then to get that out where that pre-order comes from, they'll launder it through another container, or they'll put it in, say, a personal vehicle that's coming across the San Diego-Mexican border. And instead of going through a commercial lane, it's somebody in a minivan with kids, and the stolen microchips might be hidden under the seats, and questions aren't asked. So it's amazing how that influence is happening here in the United States. And we are seeing an increase in cargo theft across the board. But as Jeff mentioned, nothing to the numbers that we're seeing out of Mexico. But yes, that influence is coming directly from Mexico, especially in that southwestern region. And that's why Jeff has some things to talk about how the Cubans are involved in the Florida region and some of the others. Great question. Thank you. Electronic thefts in California. As I mentioned earlier, thefts go on other parts of the country, but nowhere compares to California. It is the cargo theft epicenter in the United States. These here maps illustrate where the highest amount of occurrences of cargo theft are occurring. If you notice that the right in the center is California, where the brown area is at, is pretty much the Los Angeles area, which is pretty much dominant. And it has been for years. Going back, I always thought that in California, there's three different cargo thefts. There was the Los Angeles City, which is called the Bad Cats, Los Angeles County, which is called Cargo Cats. And then as Curtis mentioned earlier, the California Highway Patrol, the CTIP, which stands for Cargo Theft Interdiction Program. For years, Cargo Cats got the most of the cases, because most of the thefts seem to be happening in Compton, Commerce, different cities throughout the county. But we've seen a shift in that here, especially over the last couple of years. We've seen a shift in the number of cargo thefts. Especially over the last couple years, where so much of it's going on out in the Inland Empire. And if you look at the graphic to the right, you'll see the different hot spots throughout the state where cargo thefts are occurring. I think one of the interesting things about that is, as Jeff will discuss later in the presentation, we're going to see some very specific areas that some of this cargo theft is happening, has an awful lot to do with what are located in those cities as far as facilities. And on this here, it shows what the, I believe at the top, the electronic items are being stolen. And on computers, you're going to see that as a refrain. And there's reason for it. Computers are being targeted by this one specific organized crime group that has been unprecedented in their theft. Going back to September of 2020, they've made over 100 thefts that we know of. There couldn't be some that aren't reported, but at least 100 thefts, all involving the same MO, and all targeting electronics, primarily computers, because they're stealing these computers to sell to the, to service the Bitcoin and cryptocurrency industry. Again, with the graphic that's up there, again, we're talking about the computers that are mostly being targeted in California. And so, as Jeff mentioned, 71% of these and 71% of computers and accessories are prevalent in the electronic stuff. Now, that's not to say, and this is an interesting point, that there's a lot of food and beverage stolen, correct, Jeff? You get a large quantity of food and beverage stolen, correct? Well, it's across the board. It's not just limited electronics, but when you're looking at numbers, it's mostly electronics. There's times it might be something like apparel, it could be handbags, it could be pharmaceuticals, a number of things. But mostly, these guys are targeting electronics for the specific purpose I mentioned, because they've got a market to the people involved in the cryptocurrency. And as we previously mentioned, major targeted items include laptops, monitors, graphic cards, processors, RAM modules, and hard drive and solid-state drives. That is correct. An interesting point... Hey guys, it's... Hi, Jeff. One interesting point is that what we see in Latin America, and we're starting to see more of this in the Southern Texas area, is they steal a lot of food and beverage, because food and beverage is really easy for them to move in certain markets. I'm sorry. You had a question there, bud? Yeah. Jason. Hey, guys. This is Jason again. Just, again, very fascinating that we're talking about cryptocurrency and the spike within the theft of computers and accessories. Is that a trend that you guys have been able to identify? I guess Bitcoin, cryptocurrency has kind of been on the rise over the last decade. Has there been kind of an organic increase in exposure to that, that you've all been able to monitor over the time? Yes. And, you know, this all comes just from various contacts. And when you keep doing these types of thefts over and over and over again, you keep seeing the same thing. You start talking to other people that are more experts in cryptocurrency than we are. I have none. I'm not an expert. I want to learn about it. But it just happened during a meeting one day, when I was talking about this, and it felt to me, you know what, they're going to have these computers, and mostly gaming computers. I said, no, pray tell. And he said, well, and he started talking about cryptocurrency. And it made sense, because so many of these we've seen are specifically certain companies that only make and build gaming computers. And they've figured that out, the bad guys. And that's what they're targeting. That's what they're following. But they go after, you know, other computers, too, like loads of Surface tablets, things like that. But there's been a number of companies that build gaming computers, high-powered gaming computers that they've targeted. Interesting side note. When Jeff told me about that, my son is a programmer and a chemical engineer, a lot smarter than his father, no question about that. But Kyle, when I said, you know, Jeff had just come back from this conference, and it's gaming computers. We're at my home. Well, my son took me down to the basement. He said, remember that computer I set up down in the basement for cryptocurrency? He said, yeah. He said, it's my old gaming computer, because how robust it is, and all of the different RAM support it has. So it's amazing that they target for that very reason. Great point. Good question. Back to these electronic thefts in California, Jeff, just a couple of points you might want to discuss there on those two bullet points. Yeah, we were talking about mixed loads. I mean, and we're even seeing, when I see mixed, I always think of what's called a fact load. It's right of all kinds. We're seeing that fact loads are starting to be targeted as well. The thing that we're kind of, when I'm talking about this stuff, I get kind of crossed over, because there's two major cargo theft groups that we're going to talk about here, one less than the other. We're going to talk about an Ecuadorian group, that their MO is to follow trailers from 3PLs that usually are responsible for distributing a major brand's product. The other is, are some Indian groups. The Indian group is based out of Fontana, that does a lot of what, redirected freight types. But they kind of cross paths. And on the next presentations, our good friends from Overhaul, I think it's going to be John Cannon and Danny Ramon, they're going to talk about, because they, we kind of cross over because a lot of these loads that we're involved in have, it's cargo visibility and tracking, which they do. So the things that I'm going to talk, that Curtis and I are going to talk about more is going to be the Ecuadorians, where they're going to talk as equally about the Indians, because their thefts have always also been very electronic oriented, but here lately they're throwing us so many curveballs, they're taking everything. And that's where we're starting to get a lot into the fact loads, beer, cosmetics, different things, but they still do hit the electronics. And I think to the point that Jeff made earlier regarding ethnicity, when he says Indian groups, he's specifically referring to the country of India. These are immigrants that come here, sometimes they're involved in a pre-order theft, somebody in another country, somebody somewhere else wants something, and they stay within the culture of the folks that they hire. So the entire group, they really centralize around that Indian community in the state of California. Then they will have a cartel involvement from Mexico that's perhaps placing order or assisting them, a local Mexican gang is assisting them in distributing the goods once they've made the theft. This is just another slide. This slide here is just regarding some additional statistics regarding box truck, chassis, the types of thefts that occur. Jeff, I'm going to move to the next slide. Just a real quick note here. The reason that that bar graph is so robust on the far left-hand side, where it said cargo only because so many of these thefts are involving pilferage, where the equipment's not being So that's why that figure is so high. Very good. Historical background. This is exactly what we were talking about. This group that are Ecuadorians have been involved in cargo theft for well over a decade. And what they had done historically was target box trucks from a specific company down in Fountain Valley. And they would simply pick a truck, follow it, and whenever the driver would stop and use the bathroom or go in to a restaurant and get something to eat, they'd pull up in a couple of vehicles, usually a white van, pop the lock, and pilfer as much as they could while that driver had left that box truck unattended. And because of what this company shipped, it was mostly memory, hard drives, CPUs. That's what was targeted. But they were very, very smart because there could be large amounts of CPUs in there that serialized they would not take because they knew that it could be traced. So they would just mostly concentrate on memory. Targeted load, they're going to come to our talk about this in Fountain Valley. This is one theft that occurred in Los Angeles where I kind of laughed because of the MO involved. You have to understand about this group. These guys are very, very good. They use a lot of tradecraft. They'll meet in public places. At the end of the day, when they're done, they might park their car maybe five blocks from where they live and walk because they don't want that car to be associated with their address. These guys are very, very good at what they do. On this particular one here, once again, you see the shipping site there is down in Fountain Valley. And the theft, there's the box truck leaving. And this actually had an escort and there's the escort cars. Jason, I'm having a little problem here. Let me just click back on. Hold on. Bear with me, Jeff. Sorry, folk. This is the law site which is up right at LAX. You can see it's very bustling, very frenetic, very busy. There's no lift as our box truck arriving, backing up to a dock area. There's two different angles up there. But you can see how much activity is going on at that one particular site. I think the amazing thing about this one, this was one of the ones where I happened to be in California at the time. Jeff had already investigated this case. And then he asked me to go down and interview an escort driver, interview the drivers, and do some additional things. So this was a case we worked together on. And it was amazing the way, the manner in which they did this and the time of day, Jeff. I thought it was just amazing. I typically wouldn't have thought this could have happened. And nobody did. This was one of the really key cases that gave us a lot of insight in what was going on with this group. When I met with the security director and watched this video, he was convinced there was inside involvement. But it wasn't. Can we go to the next slide, please? Yeah. There's one of the chase vehicles that followed and followed. There's a, to the front of where you're seeing those, on the picture on the left on the front, that's a street that's right there. It doesn't look like it, but it is a street. It's not just part of the parking lot. And when the, when the perpetrators followed the van, the chase vehicle, or the escort vehicle parked right across the space where they could stare at the dock area. And during that time, one of the bad guys came up and parked directly in front of a perpendicular, blocking him in. Well, when the security director and I watched that, he said, look, Jeff, right there, what's going on? So it did, it looked very, very suspicious. So when Curtis got involved, I said, Curtis, go down and talk to that guy and ask him what's going on. Why did he allow one of the bad guys to park right in front of him? And the guy gets out and he, I don't want to steal some of his thunder, but he goes to the back, gets some cookies and, and water, certain drinks, it pays no attention. Well, to make a long story short, uh, the, uh, we interviewed the guy, Curtis interviewed him. So I didn't tell you what, what we, what we found out. Yeah. What was interesting was when I reached out, I got a call back from his daughter and his daughter said that he took this job with this escort company. The gentleman was in his mid seventies and he was paid a mileage to use his personal vehicle and his daughter would always make him a treat and lunch. We had some cookies in the trunk. The guy had claimed he was having tire problems in front. So he went to the back just to get some cookies and water. And their goal obviously was to block his view. The truck was already backed up into the Bay. So he couldn't see any activity going on in the truck at all, but they just parked that vehicle there and the gentleman was just trying to make a few extra bucks, was not well trained in this situation. And, and it turned out to be a, uh, just a financial disaster based on the theft that occurred. Go ahead, Jason. Sorry about that. Yeah. I was just going to say, can you comment? It looked like it's a pretty busy area around, uh, I guess that the trucking terminal there, does, does that sort of discourage that when you start to see, uh, so many people in, in busy areas versus maybe a little bit more rural settings? Well, not to this, just the opposite with these guys, the more crowded, the more phonetic, the better they operate. They're very good at coming out. They usually always have safety vests with them. They'll get out, they'll be able to get up and start directing traffic. They're very frenetic. They're very, and really with the more chaos, the better they operate. And then just to close out on the Curtis one, when Curtis interviewed this guy and asked for his ID, the guy's hands were shaking so much, he could barely get his ID out of his wallet. The point we're making is the, the, the escort service was, um, I don't want to use the word incompetent, but challenged to say, say the least. And what these guys done, they've done so much. The reason they followed that truck was because they knew who the escort guy was. That's why they picked that. And they had no worries about parking in front of the guy and doing their job. It wasn't an inside job. The guy just didn't, uh, wasn't very good doing his job and allowed for them to just have free reign on, on that particular. To his credit, he wasn't well-trained. He was told follow. If you see the truck deviate from its route, contact me, the supervisor, and let me know that you've seen the truck deviate. So there wasn't a lot of training that went into this escort. And of course, unfortunately, like we see so much in Mexico, that escort was right on the tail of that, of that, of that, uh, box truck. So you know who the escort is. And instead of the escort laying back, kind of viewing what's going on, he wasn't well-trained only been with the company a few months and was said, Hey, if you see the truck deviate, just give me a phone call on your cell phone. But it was a big break for us. And it's because one thing that we'd looked for years and all these steps, we, we had a hard time getting into that facility to find out more. And then on this case, it's coming up, we got a break because one of our clients ended up getting insurance for that facility and we gained access, but we could never understand or the questions we always had, why that box truck, how many box trucks went out that day? Why was that the one that was followed? And on the example we just showed you, there was a reason for it because they had done enough intel that they knew that the security escort was, was, uh, challenged at best and they weren't even concerned about it. So you know, on that particular day, I think five different box trucks went out, but now we know why that one was on, one of us followed, um, continue on the same facility. Just one quick thing on that, on that previous step before we go to Coachella. It's interesting that this was going, if I'm correct, Jeff, I remember this was going from, the facility out in fountain Valley, and then was going up to, that was an airline. It was shipping to an airline that we're going to, was going to go out of LAX. So that's why it was in that particular area. When you saw the map for it, go ahead, Jeff. Excuse me. And it was the same company. This was, this is the first case that we knew of. And I think it's the first case that existed where they graduated to following an FTL. People out there going to want an FTL full trailer load, meaning a 53 foot trailer. Always before it was box trucks. So I think on this one here, I think they had security escort for like the first 100 miles and it dropped off. And then the drivers violated protocol when they got to Coachella. Again, as everybody out there probably knows, team drivers are assigned for the specific reason of never leaving the rig unattended. But as in many cases, the drivers ignored that and both went into the truck stop at the same time. And as Jeff mentioned, you'll see up to that escort on the, on the I-10 freeway. It actually went a little further than that. And then by the time the team drivers got out into the Coachella area, they were alone and they had pulled in late after, early evening. It was early evening. It was just starting to get dark when they pulled in. And rather, I'll let Jeff tell you more detail about this. But they didn't stay with the rig. The rig, the rig ended up being unattended. Let me give you that next slide, Jeff. So you can see the shipping site there. Travel Centers of America in Coachella was the theft site. And this is the shipping site. It's a grainy picture, Jeff. Sorry about that. That's right. But this is where we shipped from at Dunn Valley. That's the loading dock and then the exit. There's the truck pulling out. And you can see in blue, you see the escort on this photo to the right. You see the escort vehicle behind. I've got a little delay, folks, on these slides. So bear with me. I'm going to wait for it to clear. There we go. We're going back. Jeff, I'm sorry. What's happening is I've got a little bit of latency. So I'm trying to advance the slide. Unfortunately, it's – let me go back here. Sorry about that, folks. A little technical difficulty here. It'll show up. There we go. There we go. This is the slide we wanted to discuss. Go ahead, Jeff. When they pulled into the truck stop, they pulled up to refuel at a fuel line. And like I said, they both went inside, leaving the rig unattended. These guys, they're typical MO. They pull up behind. Keep in mind, they've got an eyeball on the guys' side. So they know they've got free rein for a certain amount of time, as long as the drivers are inside. So they go up, pop the lock on the doors. This load contained $15 million of product. So there was an elderly couple that happened to be sitting there. And see these guys jump out of that white van wearing hoodies and just kind of dressed suspiciously. So they're like, hey, what's going on? So they actually filmed this. So these are stills from that, where they pop to the back doors of the trailer, get inside, and I think they took just under $1 million of the product. The interesting thing about this is that we weren't aware of these folks being involved, and when Jeff sent me out on this case, again, I happen to be in California, Jeff was back east in Florida when this portion of the investigation occurred, and I went out to speak with the sheriff, and the sheriff said, I got some video for you that's amazing. And he even gave me the phone number of the folks. It was an elderly couple, I want to say in their early to mid-70s. She noticed something going on. She said, honey, what is that over there? She started filming it through their car window where they were parked as they saw this van pull up. This took place with a sledgehammer on the hasp, and in less than three minutes, they stole just under $1 million. I think it was $980,000, something like that. And it's just amazing how quickly they can act in less than three minutes to steal nearly $1 million worth of goods. Do you by chance recall what the commodity was? Yeah, the commodity on this, Jeff, I'll let you speak to that. See, you're a higher rank in the company. You're the one who'll get in trouble if you say it and I don't. So it's just hard drives memory. Got it. So what's amazing in these particular, there was a combination. These particular were these chips. And a single box about the size of a VCR was valued at $35,000 to $50,000. So you'd think three operatives running this in less than three minutes. Imagine how many boxes of VCRs they were throwing from the trailer of the rig into that box van. Quickly they could get a million dollars. Had they had another couple of minutes that it could have gotten a million five that fast. I'll go to the next slide, Jeff. These others as we discussed were pilferages. This is where Jeff's going to discuss a full trailer load stolen. In the previous cases they've been pilferages. The box truck as well as that that rig that was sitting fueling while the two drivers went inside to use the bathroom and get something to eat. This is a full theft of a full trailer load here. You're going to see Danuba, California come up in a lot of these slides. The reason being is some of these loads are being shipped from a three TL to Danuba, California. There's a very large Best Buy DC out there. It's a key player in all this. That's why you're going to see industry to Danuba. Also on the full trailer loads now, when we're talking about the theft of an FTL, we're talking about them taking the entire trailer. Sometimes maybe the entire rig. Also they still pilfer. It all depends on the situation. Here you get an idea of the distance involved on where this is occurring at, where the shipment is, where the load is stolen, and then where the stolen equipment has been discarded and recovered at. Going from industry. The reason Bakersfield is very key is because on most of these shipments going from SoCal to NoCal, they're late afternoon pickups, next day deliveries. The driver, once he picks up a load, he's going to stop somewhere wherever they've got a yard. Maybe it could be somewhere in the Inland Empire. A lot of times it's in Bakersfield, which is about halfway. That's why we've had a number of thefts. If you remember that heat map we showed earlier, there was quite a bit of activity in the Bakersfield area. That's why. Because some of these truckers stop there, so that's where the thefts occur. Then depending on the situation, like maybe they just drop the trailer inside a yard, bad guys break into the yard, they get their own tractor, and they boost the whole load. Sometimes the rig might and the tractor might still be attached, so they get in there, they steal the whole rig. So it just depends on the situation. But regardless, they're going after, if they can, an FTL, a full trailer load. Here's the shipping site of one of those, and this is the company here on that shipping site, was one that builds high-powered gaming computers. This is where the driver took that load and parked it overnight. I've got a little bit of latency, folks, on these slides, so bear with us as I hit the button. It takes a couple of seconds. I don't know if it's my internet connection or what. But here's the guys, actually, if they'd followed that rig up there, here's the guys coming after hours. That's their van going into the yard. So, Jeff, I wasn't clear on this one. Let me ask you a question. On this particular one, they stole the FTL and then they dropped it here, and it was still full of product, correct? Yes. Okay. This is them actually taking that trailer out. So the rig was stolen, the trailer was dropped, and then, or the trailer was stolen, it was dropped, and then another bobtail comes in, picks up the trailer, and leaves, correct? I think what we're getting here is just that trailer being stolen. Got it. That's what they're doing, leaving the yard. Got it. Now, here's kind of reversal. Here's a load that went from Newark to industry. Casey Price from CTEP and I went up there, and again, we wanted to know how many trailers went out that day out of Newark. This would be a Seuss product. That's where a Seuss shipped out of Newark in Silicon Valley. And we had found out there were four trailers. We pulled the BOLs with the values of all to see if maybe somebody was inside tipping trailers, but they weren't. Every trailer that went out of that day were all of equal value. I think it was simply a matter of when they could get their gang together and then follow the trailer out. As you can see, pretty considerable distance. That was all the way from Silicon Valley down to industry in California. Hey, quick question, guys. Can you talk about pre-route planning, right? Do you guys recommend that? Do we have dedicated stops for these guys as they travel throughout California, or should they be changed constantly in order to kind of keep people on their toes and not knowing where you're going to maybe drop a trailer or take that break? I don't want to steal. I think that's a question, Jason, that we'll be better asked in the next presentation, because that's what overall does. Okay? Fantastic. Okay. We've seen a lot of it. We've got an opinion on it, but I think that they would be the experts in that area, that we'd rather they answer it, because they will have the right answer for your audience. On this particular case, this is a shipping site. There's a very large parking lot to the right. You can't see it. That's got a fence. You can sit in there. You can sit there all day. It's a parking lot, and you can monitor every trailer that departs from that ASUS facility up there in Newark. That's what that is. There you're seeing on the left, that's the back. That's where all the shipping is done from. It's only done from four different dock doors that are on the right or east side, and there's only one point of ingress and egress, so it's very easy to sit there and monitor trailers leaving that facility. In a case I recently did in Laredo, Texas, this was very similar. There was a single point of ingress-egress. It made it very simple for the perpetrators to park across the street and up, and there happened to be a little convenience store where they just kind of parked, and when we looked at surveillance from the convenience store, we were able to see. Of course, it was a stolen vehicle the perpetrators were using, but they then followed that load. In that case, it was a targeted load, and they stole the FTL. I guess there's a lot like that in the industry. I'm sorry? No, that's all. Okay, go back to that slide. Yeah, I've got a little latency going on here. I'm trying to... There we go. Okay, there we go. This was a Latino husband-wife team that were very cooperative with us. They gave us a lot of insight. I think they arrived that night at this facility at three o'clock in the morning, and of course, they were closed, so they didn't want to venture very far so they could get... As soon as you open in the morning, they could drop that load off, so they parked right up the street, and while they were inside there... This is just how aggressive these guys are. While they're inside the cab, parking on a public street at night, at nighttime, not leaving the rig unattended, guys pull up, pop the lock, get in there and filter out a significant amount of... I mean, every one of these losses is always going to be around at least a quarter of a million dollars, and on this one here, I think it was in that neighborhood, so when they went in the next day, they had no idea that their rig had been... They pull up, and as soon as they pull in for the deliveries, is when they realized that there had been a breach of their trailer doors and the Pilbridge product. And Jeff had called me about this case in one of our standard operating procedures. If someone's language is... Their native language is Spanish, then we want to do that interview in Spanish, so when I interviewed them, it was very interesting how emphatic they were, that we stayed with the load, we were near the facility, and they explained, look, we've been working all day long, we're beat, we go asleep, and they were very careful the way that they got into that trailer. Again, as Jeff said, they had absolutely no idea. And then the reason we say that's because so many of the times the driver gets blamed for... What we're finding in most of these steps, the drivers are rarely involved in having anything to do from a nefarious standpoint. But what they do sometimes, they might not use the best judgment on leaving the rig unattended, parking the place where it shouldn't be, things like that. The point was, these guys did about everything they could possibly do. They didn't abandon the rig, there was team drivers, they stayed with the rig, and these guys still were able to breach the trailer doors and have a successful theft. Yeah, what's interesting is Jeff and I worked a case that was literally continental US from California to Florida, and two really nice guys, two really good drivers, they're hauling just over $7 million per trailer. They're both going to the same location back east, they park in a inadequate facility, and when one driver gets there and sees that one of the rigs is missing, he assumes the guy took off early for his trip, and it turns out that both these loads were hijacked. Product ended up in Hong Kong, product ended up in Florida, I think North Carolina, Jeff, with an attempt to sell into Florida, which was actually gonna go to Germany, if I'm not mistaken. There was just a lot to this one. It was interesting, but it was, again, an electronics load and very interesting the way it happened. We've talked a little bit about targeted loads. This, we're gonna focus a little bit more on some targeted loads for you here. And I've got some latency folks on this slide, I apologize. There we go. Wood Compton, which is Acer, that's where Acer shipped from, from a 3PL, going to Danuba, California again, obviously computers. A little bit on this case, there was a lot of talk in this case there, there was some inside involvement, but so we looked at it very closely on this particular theft. There was only two trailers that went out that day, an Amazon trailer, and then of course one that was going to Best Buy Danuba. Well, the Amazon trailer, as people know, they're heavily logoed, easily identified, so thieves stay away from that. But on this one here, they both went out in the afternoon, around 2 o'clock, 2.30, like I said, shipped in Compton, going to Commerce, or it was actually still in Commerce because the driver took a break there. But when... I'll just wait for the next slide. What you're going to see is the bullet points you attended with the tractors recovered, the trailers recovered, both up in the Redlands, which is very calm for these guys because that's the Inland Empire where they've got operations out there. As you can see here, there's the shipping site. Again, one point of ingress, egress, so it's pretty easy for the thieves to just kind of monitor. They cannot see that, that dock area is in the back off the street, but to access that, there's only one point of ingress and egress, so they can drive by a number of times just waiting for the trailer to come out. Here's a car, when we started watching video prior to the theft, this sedan was going back and forth waiting for that trailer. This is where the... what the driver did, he went there to park overnight and pulled into this rented lease space he had in Commerce. It's kind of actually hard to get to, but that's where they followed him to, and then once he dropped the trailer up there and it was left alone and thieves went in there and stole that. Yeah, full disclosure, we don't want to leave an impression that Aramco Imports had anything to do with this. This was just off the Google map, it was the facility to the right. And then they just had leased space in it. Now we're going to kind of switch from the thefts in California and trucks to actually a warehouse burglary that went on down in Louisville, Kentucky. They're pretty recent. And I think the reason this relates to in transportation is that Jeff will discuss the details of this case, but I think more importantly, you know, there's product that is being basically staged for shipping, and then there were some opportunities that the bad guys saw here. So we thought it important to incorporate a burglar of this targeted facility because it was related to everything that was in transit and opportunities that the perpetrators saw and the opportunities that they took. So it's interesting. We'll go slowly through this one because there's a lot of detail that we want to show. This is our last case study and then we'll open it for some questions. But there's some detail Jeff and I thought was necessary to go into this. Jeff, next slide. Well, think about this when we're talking about transportation. The whole reason this warehouse was burglarized is because it's set right next door to a facility where they had followed trailers out of. So I think when they went by, they noticed the name was very visible in front of the facility. I think all they did was Google it and saw what they carried inside, and that's what kind of led this warehouse burglary. If you guys, and I'm going to steal a little bit of thunder from my dear friend down in Florida, Willie Morales, who was a founding member of the Tomcats that started that task force. Willie always talks about this is involving the Cubans that are based on the Hialeah, Florida. They've got a faction that operates up in Louisville. And Willie does a great presentation that every time he's done it, I'm going to steal a little bit of it, where he shows the mayoral boat lift that went on. If any of you, the audience out there, have seen the movie with Al Pacino in it. Gosh, I have a hard time remembering the name of the movie right now. I'm sorry? Was the movie named Heat by chance? No, it wasn't Heat. No, it was the one where he's the crime star down in Miami. But in that particular film, there's a lot, of course the movie's fictional, but a lot of the events are non-fictional. And when they show the boat lift and where they housed the people that came in under I-95, they called it Freedom Town. And that's where these thieves came from. Castro sent them there and said, go rob America blind. And that's what these guys have done. Well, a large faction of these, or certain factions, these have relocated to Louisville. And it's a very good reason why. Because you've got FedEx, UPS, T-Mobile, and Sprint VCs just south of Muhammad Ali International Airport in Louisville. So the Cubans have been very active there for years. A lot of trailer activity, a lot of loads being hauled out. Well, back in the spring, Bobby Motley and the Kentucky State Police, along with Paul Meyer from the FBI, caught these guys about five years ago. And they went to the joint. Well, that stopped all that. And these guys worked not just in Louisville, but up and down the eastern seaboard. Well, this spring they got out and they started up again. And they started, first of all, they started off with, they went to a facility that shipped Microsoft product, thinking they were going to get Xbox 360s. But they did not realize that it changed to Facebook and Meta. So what they ended up following were trailers that actually had the ocular, they showed them the ocular. Virtual reality headsets. Exactly. So that's what they followed. They followed one to Arkansas and one went to a yard in Shively. And when we started monitoring that, we showed products from both thefts started to be activated down in Hialeah. So we knew what the Cubans were up to. Well, about a month after that, this warehouse got burglarized. And we had our insurance company call us and said, can you guys go down and investigate? So what we're looking at here, as you can see where Louisville is, on this particular theft, these guys stole trailers across the river in Jeffersonville. That's what that photo is on the left. And it's very, very close proximity. But they sold two trailers. They're just out of opportunity. The picture on the right shows the yard where these trailers were at. It didn't have a whole lot of security. It had CCTV. But it's also very close to one of the thieves' house. All out of convenience. Here's the yard, had all these trailers, where two of these trailers were boosted from. When these guys broke in, we're going to show you some slides here in just a little bit. This is a vehicle that was caught on video that was going around the warehouse. As you can see, it's a Dodge. It's got an aluminum ladder hanging out the back. I've advanced. There we go. Here's where they're breaking into the facility. You might not be able to tell, but the guy at the top picture is the fellow using a sledgehammer to break the glass. And just so you know, this part was not alarmed. And then you see once they, they wait a while before they go in, because after they break the glass, they kind of wait for about 15 minutes to see if there's going to be a response. When there's no response and they enter the facility with that ladder. Yeah, you can see there to the left in the in the verbiage that they broke the glass at 10.50 and then two individuals wearing dark clothes, hoods, and gloves enter the building with the ladder. That was some 20, what is that, 25 minutes later. So what they do is they'll go hide in an area, sit in their truck, whatever, go off to an area to see if law enforcement attends or a security company comes out. When they didn't after 25 minutes, they knew that it wasn't alarmed in the front portion of the building. And here's the point of entry. This is where they had the sledgehammer. Outside view, inside view, smash the glass to gain entry. So they breached the building. And like I said, it was not alarmed. Now once they got inside, they had, the point of the ladder was to enter the ceiling there and then traverse inside the facility over to the server room. Just waiting on the slide bud. There we go. And let me go back one, because it jumped just as I did it. Bear with me. Sorry, folks. You know, most of our internet here in the state of Utah is provided on horseback. So that's why we're going a little slower here. But what they did is they traversed over to the server room. And there's a reason why you can see how they came down. They took out the server and also the security system. However, they did not realize there was a second server in there, which they did not get. And that's why we got the CCTV images of the truck driving by, the break-in with the sledgehammer, and the ladder. But once they got inside. Why so much damage? Sorry about that, Jeff. Why so much damage to the server room? Because they wanted to make sure that everything was cleaned out there, that they'd damaged the server. So they even took the VCR. They did not realize there was a second one there. But all those wires as part of the security system, the server, they wanted to make sure that stuff was inoperable. That's why so much damage there. After this, I've got a follow-up on that, Jason. It's interesting. I'll share with you. Let me go to this slide. Jeff, this is the one. That's right. This is where they're stealing the tractor in the yard, correct? No. They've stolen two tractors from another site. I ended up recovering the tractors and the trailers. But here, they're using a stolen tractor to remove two trailers from across the river in Jeffersonville to go back to the facility and back up the docks and load them up with steel products. So this is that bobtail backing into the trailer. And this one here is waiting for that slide to show. There we go. See how close that's downtown Louisville on the right? And this is a kitchen cabinet manufacturer over in Jeffersonville where they stole these two trailers, both trailers being emptied. Very good. One thing I'd like to mention here is we've got a little bit of time. And we've got some time for questions. But there was a case that I had, and Jeff and I were discussing it. Actually, I got the assignment from Jeff. And there was a mail facility that was contracted by Brown. And they had a building in Northern California. And they'd really cased this place out. And there was some concern early on that it could have been potentially an inside job. But when we found out how they got in and what they did, it was simply that someone knew a, let me be careful here, a construction worker who had worked in the area. So he had a layout of some measurements. And then he had a friend asking questions. And of course, it's always interesting who was really involved. But what they did is they went up on the roof of this warehouse. And using those measurements, they literally cut a hole in the roof. They dropped down through the rafters to a drop ceiling. And they planned it to where they came right into the server room. Guess which room didn't have a camera. Guess which room didn't have anything in there except all of the servers, all of the CCTV recording equipment, and everything necessary was that one server room. Once they got in there, they disengaged all the alarms. They knew quite a bit about alarm systems. We found out that one of the individuals involved knew a fair amount about alarm systems. And then what they did from there is they were just able to go throughout the facility and take what they needed. Again, Jason, exactly the question that was posed is that you walked in that server room, and the wires are just torn up. Things are cut. They were very quick, very efficient in the manner in which they went into that building. I think that what we see in the US is taking a lot of the things that Mexico has done for years as we're starting to see the hijacks, just kind of in a quick summary. And what we're seeing in Mexico are the very things, these types of thefts, where they're calculated. There's a lot of deception, falsified documents, the type of things we see, fictitious pickups, where they falsify documents to be able to represent themselves as a trucker, they're not. But we're seeing a lot of that influence, especially in that Southwest region. You know, Jeff spends a lot more time in California than he would probably care to being a Texas man, and he's in California a lot because we just have so much cargo theft there. And then you'll see Jeff in Memphis or Florida or up in Toronto where there's a group that are from Pakistan. There's a big Pakistan culture of cargo thieves up there. We see just a lot of it in these key areas. And I would say we've been a little busy during COVID. We were crazy busy, but nothing like 2021 and 2022. We are busier than we have ever been. So if there's 54 people out there that need a job, we're looking. It's just been crazy, Jeff. To close the loop on this case here. I'm sorry? No, go ahead. To close the loop on the case down in Louisville, they stole two trailers, but how the whole thing, where they even realized there was a theft, is one of these two trailers was backed up to their dock when they came in and they're going, that's not our trailer, what's that trailer doing backed up there? So it became a process to identify whose trailer that was, why it was there. But the only, they left it there, but the other trailer, they filled up with product and sold a significant amount of product from that warehouse, mainly PF5s. That's what they were targeting. And there's amazing technology out there. We just saw a presentation on it when we were out in Monrovia, California last week during a cargo theft conference that came into play here. This particular business park has block cameras in it. Well, the detectives shared that information with me. The great young detective in Louisville worked his ass off on this case, that had no cargo theft experience. The primary investigating agency that has done great work down in Kentucky is the Kentucky State Police. Bobby Motley headed that unit for years. He's now retired, a dear friend. And Gary Thomas and Steve Spurlock are very actively involved now and helped me a lot on this case. But there was actually a detective with the city of Louisville, they had jurisdiction, did a great job. And we started reviewing this camera footage. And when we did, we got a plate off of that pickup truck. And also we figured out what was going on. After careful watching with this amazing technology, we saw that trailer that was backed up for the docks to go in. And then we also saw the second trailer with different ID numbers on it, leaving that product. So that's how we knew the two trailers were still in the same place, but one of them was never used. So anyway, what that did, it led us to one of our bad guys. There's five principal bad guys down there. We know the names of all of them. Well, that pickup truck just happened to be registered one of them. So this is still an ongoing case. There's things going on, but law enforcement has some very good information, is doing a lot of work on what will probably lead to some arrests in this case. But like I said, if you don't know about the flock cameras and the capabilities and that technology, it's phenomenal. It's a true game changer. And Jeff, real quick to review. So this was the case that you were explaining to me. The original hit was at the warehouse. They break into the warehouse and then this was a theft of opportunity. When they saw this open yard, they were basically able to go shopping and connect a couple of trailers and take those away, correct? No, this was one where they strictly broke in to the warehouse. We don't know what kind of intel they had. They might've done some things, like I told the guys at the warehouse. I asked them, had anybody show up as a delivery man? Anything to gain access, they decided to see what they had. But no, this was a targeted theft where they broke into that warehouse because, I mean, you'd go online and look at the name of that company and see that they carry PFIs. That's what they were after. That was the main thing they were after. And then- No, I was referring to the yard. The yard was the theft of opportunity, correct? Where they took the trailers? Oh, of course. Oh, yeah, yeah, that was across the river. Oh, absolutely. Sure, no doubt. No question. My fault. No, no problem. Okay. Let me go to the next slide. So folks, I think what we decided to do, we wanted to leave about 15 minutes open for questions. We've got a number of the things to tell you that, so if anyone has any questions at all, and there's a couple of things that we'd still like to review, but we wanted to make certain that we left it open to questions at this point. Yes, for everybody that's on the call now, definitely use the chat box and feel free to ask some questions. Really, really good presentation, guys. I can't say that enough. Really fascinated by all the topics that you covered. And I just had one, just kind of keeping in mind, you are talking to an audience of underwriters. So we're definitely, I'm definitely startled, but let's get to it. Okay. So we're definitely, I'm definitely startled a little bit, right? So with that said, is there any sort of best practices from a risk mitigation standpoint that our insured can be taking to best protect their goods and ultimately their insurance portfolio? Well, that's a great question, Jason. That's something I can answer partially. Last week, I spoke at a conference in Monrovia, California on, so your cargo south of the border, cargo theft south of the border. And as all the underwriters on this video conference know, the reason that folks like Jeff and I even exist is because underwriters need to understand what their risk is, what exactly happened in this theft? Who was responsible? Was there anything within a fidelity clause that someone within that company broke the rules? Are there certain warranties within a particular policy? And we've had some very interesting cases where we ask a lot of the right questions based on our experience, because we know what the ultimate goal is, is to first find out, did a theft really occur? We have to confirm in Mexico or the US and we'll find cases, Jeff can attest to this, where there's been cargo theft and people that didn't file a police report and they go first to their insurance company and or to their broker. And then in Mexico, I get that a lot. And unfortunately, we're working typically for a US or a European insurance group that does business from an underwriting perspective down in Latin America. And one of the things that we notice all the time is that not only is there an interest in recovering the goods, finding who the perpetrators are, but seeing if there were any relationships and we do this all without prejudice. We just ask enough questions to where these things come up. Because obviously in our investigations, we don't wanna go into a situation where there is an assured who is devastated by their loss. They need to be taken care of. But sometimes in that process, we find mistakes are made. And many times insurance companies will say, we'll bypass that mistake this time, but the underwriter has to say, in the future, we need to watch this, we need to watch this. I'll comment on something we've talked a fair amount about Jeff, if you don't mind, I'll comment on escorts. And one of the problems, as I mentioned previously, when we see escorts, escorts can be a wonderful resource. Obviously, we would prefer that the trucking companies have better technology. But unfortunately, just like Mexico, there are hundreds of thousands of truckers that are independent small trucking companies, and sometimes they don't have the resources for all the latest technology that's out there. But when an escort is required within a policy, one of the things is I think an underwriter could make certain that folks are aware that there need to be certain standard operating procedures by that escort company. Many times the fact that an escort is falling so closely behind as I previously mentioned, as it's been a targeted load from a facility, and that escort goes only a certain mileage to get them to a certain location, then what they're doing is they're signaling to the bad guys sitting out on the street, you know, videotaping with their phone, communicating with the other bad guys. They might not be the ones that are gonna make the hit, but they know they got on the 10 freeway heading eastbound. So originally, Jeff, if I'm not mistaken, on the FTL rig, on the rig coming out of Fountain Valley, they got up to the 10 and then headed east. Originally, it was a small car. The actual vehicle that made the hit was a box van when it's once it got out to Coachella. So what they were able to do is when there is an escort falling behind, aha, that's a higher value load than we might typically see. And a great question that Jeff always asks, that I ask now, it's critically important to underwriters, is what left that facility? Why that particular trailer? And I find more information just by asking that. There were nine loads that went out that day. Why were it these nine loads? Well, if that ninth load is the highest value load by leaps and bounds that particular day, how did the perpetrators know that that was the load to hit? Which then, you know, there's no evidence to this yet, but you might take a little closer look at employees within the facility, which was not the case here. But it's interesting, as the underwriters look at this, the more investigative information comes in, I think it's critically important, not just for the adjuster to look at a report, whoever that report comes in from, but when underwriters are looking at it, I'm certain that they review any past history and get into some details of things like technology, things like escorts, those types of things, because we're seeing some trends come into the U.S., and we're seeing U.S. trends, deceptive pickups going down into Mexico. We have a, I'll finish on this point. We have a new phenomenon in Mexico, and we've tagged it as grandma victims. This is amazing. There was a trucker who was not really a trucker, just a crook, a thief, and they had a few tractors, and he was in one particular city in Mexico. He went to another city and walked into a grocery store where a grandmother was buying vegetables, literally, and she was getting stuff for her masa for the tortillas she was making. She had three grandchildren, her and her husband. Her husband worked in a local industry. She was a stay-at-home grandma, sometimes would have the grandkids with her. And when this particular guy comes in, he's the nefarious guy. He walks up to a woman who was in her 70s and convinced her that he'd pay her a few hundred dollars a month if they'd just collect her mail. And she said yes. She was a little uncomfortable. He was a handsome kid. He did all the right things. He then goes and makes a federal registration of her as a corporate officer and tags her city as the headquarters for this nefarious trucking company. They go and pick up five loads in a nefarious act with deceptive means, and who do the police go to arrest? The 72-year, 73-year-old grandmother for cargo theft. Thank goodness one of our agents interceded in this and explained everything that went on or she'd have gone to jail as the president of the XYZ fake trucking company. And these guys just used her to get their five loads and that was it. So we're seeing more of those things in the US too. Those are, that's a very interesting story there. It's just to a memory block there. Scarface, the movie I was talking about. I'm sure people see the Al Pacino movie, Scarface, that deals a lot. I have seven grandchildren. I just watch Disney movies now, okay? That's all. That's the thing I wanted to do real quick. We kind of forgot. All those great statistical slides that were given were provided by our good friends at CargoNet. So I want to thank Keith Lewis, Ralph Pepe, Sal for their great help and assistance. A tremendous resource for us in everything we do. And also don't forget Shannon. Shannon had a lot to do with that as well. So thank you CargoNet. Fantastic. We actually have a couple of questions that have come through, guys. What kind of recovery of stolen goods and apprehension of thieves do you see Well, I'll try to make that a quick answer. Going back when before the, I got to be careful because I don't want my political views to come out. But there's been liberal prosecutors that went into very, very key venues. As you well know, like in LA, Dallas, where you have to steal something like 950 or 750 before the report's even taken. So, you know, there's a lot of people that have been involved in that. 950 before the report's even taken. So because of that, it's also affected like the bail. So there's no more bail. So in the past, we were able to take it, the police was able to take a bad guy, arrest him, he posts bail, then they could turn that guy into an informant. When that was going on, we had informants, and I'm going back, you know, before the BLM situations and all that, it was rare, the cargo theft did not occur that we did not get a call from an informant saying, hey, are you missing a load of ASUS computers or whatever the product might be? And we'd say, yeah, we are. And then we'd say, have that informant buy one, we'd check serial numbers, and then the game would be on about trying to make a buy to get the product back and also protect our informant so he wasn't harmed or killed. That happened all the time, almost every time. I'm not saying we always got recovers, but it was always in play. And that led to a lot of recovers. Now, today, it's a different ballgame. We don't have that resource. So we're getting less and less. Recovers are still made, but a lot of times it's done by accident, where we might have enough information or maybe some technology is pointing the breadcrumb trail to a certain warehouse, warrants are obtained, and then hit the warehouse. And a lot of times, we recover a product that we weren't really looking for. We go, oh, yeah, that's what happened seven months ago, not the thing we actually went there for. So I hope that answers your question. Recoveries are still made, but they're less than they used to be. And Jason, one point I think this is good for underwriters as Jeff brings up so clearly, two items. Number one, there's no comment here regarding people's desire to get the people who are in that low crime status out of jail. The problem is I don't think that anyone on either side of the political aisle realized that when you're doing that cashless bail situation, when people are getting out on bail, well, that applies to everyone. So you're getting some guys who might not be involved in a nonviolent situation who've just stolen $7.5 million worth of hard drives or microchips. And because they were arrested, say, in Los Angeles County, then there is a slap on the wrist. They're out before you can really turn them into an informant if it's one of the operatives within that organization. And that's a real problem. And secondly, I think one of the key points is for the underwriters, there's an awful lot of standard operating procedures that the assured should do. And what Jeff and I find out all the time is your very first phone call when a cargo theft occurs, you need to make certain there's a police report filed with the proper agency. But more importantly, let your insurance company know immediately the assureds need to do that so that people like Jeff or myself or any of the other numerous industries, people in our industry can get involved quickly. I had a recovery of some trucks, some very expensive trucks, in the middle of nowhere in Mexico that were hijacked. These were very high-end trucks. The cartel loves these trucks. But a client, an assured, acted quickly, notified the insurance company. And the insurance company acted quickly, notified us. I was on a plane that night and arrived that early morning at 5.30 in the morning when my law enforcement buddies picked me up. And because these trucks were going to be put on a ship, there was very low fuel in them. We recovered them by circumchance, simply because they'd ran out of gas, they were in the weeds, and law enforcement got there with our alert and the assured's alert to the cartels coming back to get the trucks. And you're talking about trucks that were valued at $93,000 to $96,000 each. And in the end of it, three of the six trucks, where two were recovered immediately and one later in another circumstance. So speed is of the essence on all of these types of things. Fantastic. Fantastic. And I actually have another. And that was Timothy who asked the question originally. But we got one in from Randall. Can you comment on any theft protection solutions the victims of these thefts were using? Locking systems, tracking systems, which I think you just alluded to, Curtis. Monitoring, GPS monitoring. Is there any consistency that you see with the assured's out there? I think the great thing that's going to happen is this next presentation. They're going to hit on all these key points, as Jeff previously mentioned. There's an awful lot that can be done. But let me just say this. As Jeff has taught me so well, cargo thieves look for the, you know, we hear the old joke. My dad used to use this one. If a bear comes upon you, do you need to outrun the bear? And I said, well, I better be faster. And my dad said, no, just outrun the buddy sitting next to you because the bear is going to get the first opportunity. So the more we make all of these situations less attractive. Wait a minute, they've got a kingpin. Wait a minute, they've got this type of lock. Wait a minute, this is a bigger company. They've got a reputation for GPS. They will shy away from those. They're looking for those easy targets. While we don't have any time, Jeff has a great piece that is one of the most prolific cargo thieves in the Western United States, Jeff Cucco. When he would, the way he would tag the trailers. A very simple way of putting, I can't remember, Jeff, was it X's or O's, something like that, in orange paint, something of that effect. Yeah, so by doing that, he let his bad guys know which one it was. He never targeted anything that would be so secure as to where they couldn't get to it. It was stuff that was much easier to take. But just real quick on that, there's great technologies out there now. But the problem that comes into play a lot of times, where do you draw the line? For example, let's say you have a policy that anything that's a high value load, that 750,000 or more gets tracking on it. What about the lowest $650,000? It's also a high value load. Does that mean you don't track it? And it comes down to a dollar and cents issue. Although so many more tracking devices out there of very low cost exist. So it's just, a lot of times, Jason, it has to do, have you been victimized before? If you've never had a problem, you'll go along for years saying nothing's gonna happen. But I can equate it to, I don't mean to be morbid here, but it's kind of like a plane wreck. When you look at how many planes are in the sky right now in North America, how many are there? Untold thousands. How many of them crashed? Thank God, very few. But when it does, it's a catastrophe. It's kind of the way it is with trailers. How many trailers are out in North America right now carrying high dollar goods? How many of them get stolen? Really very few. When they do, the people that insure it, or the broker that's made that load, it's catastrophic. Jason, one of the key points I see too is a lot of these smaller tracking devices now that are going into the actual load so that they're hidden in a pallet. And that's a huge advantage for law enforcement when these things are missing. Thank you. Great questions. Yeah, fantastic. Nicole actually asked a similar question just about GPS tracking devices and recovery of stolen goods. I think you guys just commented on that if there's anything else you wanted to add. Just like I said, really pay attention to the next presentation. John Cannon's a very good friend of mine. Danny Ramone's very good friends. We work together all the time because what we're talking about, one of these loads might get stolen. When my first call, or John Cannon will call me and say, Jeff, what do you know about this load? Or vice versa. And they've got a great product. They do great work. So like I said, pay particular attention to their presentation. Fantastic, guys. I think we're okay to take a break. We're pushing 2.30 here. Lily and Eileen, not sure if you're able to jump on, but I think that we're okay to take a break. Jeff, Curtis, again, fantastic information. That was awesome. Really enjoyed it. Yep, we'll take a break until three o'clock Eastern time. Thanks, everybody. Thanks, guys. Welcome. Curtis, you can hit end for me, but I'm going to hit roll. So what it says is it's asking me if I should leave or end webinars. The only question it's asking. I think leave is it. You don't want to end. I'll just hit leave. Yep. Hey, John, your video looks great. Just let's check your audio. Okay, how's that? That is perfect. So you've passed the audio video test. And Danny, great video. Let me just double check the audio. Mic check one, two. Excellent. Okay, so then let's meet back at like one minute before three, and I'll just give you a keyboard control on your PowerPoint. Sounds good. So got about 30 minutes. Sounds good. Perfect. Thank you. Bye. Thank you. So we can jump off, Danny? Well, you can turn off your camera and your microphone. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. All right. Hey, good afternoon there, Danny. Good afternoon. I think we'll just give it another minute or so, and we'll go ahead and get cranked up here. Okay. I don't know if Eileen told you, it's at least for the beginning of the presentation, it's gonna be just me. Okay, fantastic. All right, let's go ahead and get started. Welcome back, everybody. I hope everyone had a chance to decompress a little bit. A lot of good information shared in that first webinar there, and hopefully you guys had a chance to check some emails, turn some phone calls, as I did as well. Just kind of entering back into the second session, figured we'd have a little bit of fun here and open up with a trivia question. Looks like there's a $25 Amazon gift card on the line, so all attention here, guys. And here we go. As we just celebrated Veterans Day last week, does anybody know, and let's use the question box for you guys to fill in your answer, does anybody know what Veterans Day was originally called? Is it A, Remembrance Day, B, Armed Forces Day, C, Military Services Day, or D, Armistice Day? Feel free to use the box. Fantastic. All right, looks like we got a winner here. Is that Lois Cutler? I believe you are our winner. It is D, Armistice Day. Big shout out to all the veterans. If we have anybody on the line that is a veteran, appreciate your service. And thank you for your work, and we'll certainly look to get that Amazon gift card going. That's awesome. All right. All right. With that said, our next session, afternoon session today, guys, will focus on transit security. Our presenters today look forward to your questions throughout the presentation. So just as many of you guys just chimed in for the trivia question here, feel free to use that box, and we'll try to interject your question in strategically throughout the presentation. Otherwise, we'll hold it over to the end. But definitely load that box up. Two guest speakers today. Again, very excited to kind of pick up where we left off from this earlier afternoon's time. We have Danny Ramone, who's the intelligence and response manager, and John Cannon, who's ex-law enforcement liaison for overhaul. In supply chain intelligence and response manage for over a decade, Danny has closely monitored and analyzed multiple factors that disrupt a supply chain with a focus on cargo theft incidents and trends happening not just in the United States, but globally. Presenting with Danny, as just alluded to, John Cannon has over 40 years in law enforcement experience, having served in several different positions with the Georgia Bureau of Investigations, and excited to hear what these guys are talking about. So Danny and John, Danny, I think you'll take the lead, but the floor is yours. Thank you very much, Jason. Yeah, unfortunately, John is not gonna be able to join us at least for the first part of the presentation. It is the fourth quarter shipping season. It's a very busy time for shippers and carriers, and it's also a very busy time for cargo thieves. So unfortunately, he is dealing with a live recovery at the moment. So if he's able to join us, he absolutely will. If not, I'm gonna go ahead and take the reins on this and walk you through supply chain security. We are gonna open up with a little bit of cargo theft trends, kind of what we're seeing from our perspective. And then we're gonna go into some case studies where we talk about how security could have been more proactive in those cases, and look at the breakdowns in those cases and how they were eventually recovered as well. Let me see here. Okay. Again, John Cannon is our law enforcement liaison. He's one of two that we have in the United States. Bobby Motley is our other law enforcement liaison. Between the two of them, we've got over 80 years of law enforcement experience focused on cargo theft task forces as well. So they are great folks to have on our team, and they are definitely earning their keep right now. Okay, I do wanna open up with a quick poll. I do understand we're talking to a lot of underwriters here. So I'm very interested to see how this looks from y'all's perspective. Have you experienced cargo theft in the last year? And if yes, what type? So I'm gonna go ahead and give a few seconds for that to go through, for you guys to put in your answers. Okay, so over half of you have not dealt with cargo theft in the last year. Those of you that have dealt with cargo theft have dealt with both. And if you've only dealt with one kind, it looks like full truckload has about half again, as many as pilferage. That's about what I would have expected to see, honestly. Now, we do know, those of us who are in the reporting industry, do know that pilferage is very likely the most voluminous form of cargo theft. But it doesn't get reported nearly as much. And part of that is because, if it doesn't meet the deductible, there's not gonna be a claim filed. If there's not gonna be a claim filed, there's likely not gonna be a police report either. When we see things like that, a lot of times we see these losses chalked up as leakage or shrinkage or just an inventory error or something like that. But it is interesting to see. And I would venture to guess that about five years ago, pilferage would have been virtually non-existent on this list, coming from underwriters specifically. Because in the last couple of years, pilferage has become such an issue, both the volume and the value of those pilferages has skyrocketed in the last three years to the point where it can no longer be ignored. So that's definitely something that we've seen with large scale pilferages, emptying 80 plus, 90 plus percent of a 53 foot trailer. We're seeing that happen on a regular basis now. And I think that's a big reason why a lot of people are starting to think why a lot of the reporting of pilferage has gone up. So we are seeing statistics rise. Do we think that it's a bigger problem in terms of number of pilferages than it has been in years past? Probably not. But again, the issue is coming in the form of severity. How much product is being taken when they're not even taking the entire trailer? So definitely something to watch. All right. So just real quick overview on cargo theft trends and modes. Full trailer load thefts, traditionally referred to as straight cargo theft in the United States, has been kind of the bread and butter of cargo thieves for the longest time, for decades at this point. Strategic cargo theft, however, is one of those that gets underreported quite a bit. Strategic cargo theft can be any form of fraud. We've seen stolen carrier identities, stolen driver identities, fabricated driver identities and carrier identities, anything using technology in order to obtain loads, whether that's internet load boards or any type of falsification of documents that can be done digitally. We're seeing all of these things all across the industry primarily. We're uncovering a lot of them in California, but it is happening across the country. Again, pilferage thefts we just alluded to has been a rising problem for the last three, three and a half years, has been increasing in severity and volume. And part of that is because of rail thefts as well. Now, rail thefts don't typically make it into statistics. The railroad companies in the United States are private industries. They're not required to report any losses that they suffer. And by and large, they keep that information pretty close to the chest. So we don't typically get what I would call very reliable statistics on rail theft. But of course, earlier this year and late last year, it was such a problem that it could not be ignored. It made it into mainstream media news. There were stories and reports of trains actually derailing off of the tracks because of the amount of refuse that had just been taken off the trucks or taken off the containers and just discarded by the tracks, piling up so high that it actually did cause at least one confirmed train derailment. There's something like three or four other trains that they suspect derailed for the same reasons. They just don't have the hard and fast proof on that. Commercial warehouse burglaries or facility thefts are another big problem. Those can prove to be very problematic because of the amount of product that is going to be left vulnerable when they're inside a warehouse or a distribution center. We've often seen thefts where people will get away with multiple full truckloads of product because they're emptying an entire warehouse overnight or sometimes over the course of a couple of days. Cross docking as a method of stealing cargo is another specific fraudulent type of theft, but it's something that we're seeing a big rise in, especially in California. Now, even if it's not being stolen, cross docking has become almost standard practice. If you're leaving from California or if you're leaving really from any major logistics hub, if it's a port city or a major trucking city where there's an intersection of a couple of major interstate highways, think Atlanta, think Dallas, think Los Angeles, think Port of Savannah, Chicago. With the rates as high as they are, if there's any spare space on a trailer, these carriers are gonna try and charge twice for that trip. So they're gonna load a second load of cargo in there if there's any room, and they're gonna charge both clients full price. Even if it is in the contract, that you're supposed to be a dedicated load, that you're not supposed to have any other LTL freight loaded into that trailer with your cargo, a lot of times, most people don't have a way to verify whether or not that's happening, whether or not this kind of cross docking or double loading is taking place. So unless you have the means to monitor for compliance, that's something that's going to expose your cargo to more eyes than you would want to have on it, especially if it's sensitive cargo. So we're starting to see stolen cargo being sold on internet sale sites, and we are starting to see the use of GPS jammers in the US. It's happened occasionally, but now we're starting to see it being employed on a smaller scale, but for some of these fraudulent thefts. They're using it to disguise locations of where the tractor and trailer really are while they're feeding different stories to whoever may be asking, in order to gain a more lead time before the theft is actually discovered, before any physical investigations go out to try and recover that shipment. Oh, I think I skipped two slides there. All right, so for the pilferage thefts, where and how do they happen? Typically, unsecured parking, any kind of unsecured parking, anywhere where there's not an actual live security guard, and even then, that doesn't necessarily make it secure parking. But when we're talking about unsecure parking, we're talking about no fence, no gate, no cameras, no guards. Truck stops are very common, rail yards. So we do see thefts off of the trains, not just in rail yards, but along the tracks as well. By and large, the backup problems that we were seeing in Southern California earlier this year, by and large have stopped where we're not seeing freight trains stopping in residential neighborhoods for three days at a time anymore. That's been a big improvement. Distribution center yards, another big one is destination warehouses, especially if it's a big box, retail location type of distribution center. Thieves will just camp out there knowing that, likely somebody's gonna be waiting outside of the facility overnight. And if it's a Best Buy or something that sells electronics or has high priced items in the store, there's a fairly good chance that they're gonna be able to pop open the doors on that trailer and get something profitable for them. Okay, now when they're performing these large scale pilferages, what exactly are they looking for? How do these things happen? They typically will pick a truck stop and these truck stops are determined usually by proximity to a large shipping area or industrial area. So if you think of LA and the Inland Empire, Barstow, California and Bakersfield, California are kind of the first big stops once you leave that LA metro area. Truck stops there have seen a lot of activity. And if you go even a little bit further East into Arizona, we've seen a lot of activity there. Again, because we know that anything leaving Southern California is gonna be going this direction. You calculate out four to six hours before a driver's gonna stop. You can pretty much pick what the most attractive truck stop to a commercial driver is gonna be. And that's gonna be, you know, good hunting grounds. They'll usually arrive there between 10 p.m. and 2 a.m. So, you know, absolute cover of darkness and conduct surveillance. They're gonna start shopping and locate any loads that they like. And at that point, they're gonna call in their accomplices, again, with box trucks, with a straight truck themselves. And they're gonna go and remove that shipment or as much of the shipment as they can fit while the driver is asleep or possibly while the driver is not with the tractor trailer and transport that stolen merchandise to a storage facility. So when we look at this, how can security sort of be proactive and stop these kinds of things? You wanna examine the routes. You wanna examine your departure times. And you wanna be able to determine where it's likely that your driver's gonna stop. And you wanna limit where he's gonna stop in high-risk areas. Again, as Jeff and Curtis alluded to in the previous presentation, great presentation, by the way, low-hanging fruit, right? They're always doing a risk versus reward calculation. And they want what they want. They want what's gonna be profitable. They wanna get their hands on that, but they're not gonna put themselves in jail in order to get it, right? Because that's not gonna do them any good. They're not gonna be able to get any profit if they're locked up. So definitely, excuse me. So definitely looking for the low-hanging fruit is what they're gonna be doing. They're gonna be going for the low risk. If they know that there's security measures in place on a shipment, they're gonna bypass those if they know how. If not, they're likely gonna go ahead and look for something that's a little bit softer of a target. So it is a balance that you have to maintain between the security through obscurity kind of lens, as well as just making sure that your shipment is actually secure. So when I say security through obscurity, we're talking about high-value hardened container seals or trailer seals on the back are definitely a flag to a thief that there's something valuable in there. Just as Curtis and Jeff mentioned, an escort on a shipment lets them know that there's something obviously very valuable, very important in that shipment. So it is a balance, and you have to know what's going on in that area, what the landscape of cargo theft looks like in the areas that your shipment's gonna be traveling through. Now, train pilferages, again, they happen when the train is stopped or staged for several hours. Earlier in the year, it was happening for several days at a time, and they will use power tools to remove the high-security locks. A lot of times, especially on trains, that's exactly, they're not gonna open every single container, but they're gonna look for high-security seal locks, again, knowing that that's probably gonna contain the most valuable cargo inside. They're also gonna replace the original seals with replacement seals. They might not match. They might not be those high-security seals. In all likelihood, they're not going to be, but you can pick up trailer seals at pretty much any truck stop, and they will just put the seals on those containers just so that those containers don't arouse any suspicion by not having a seal on the container. Again, that gives them more lead time, and if any investigations come, it's gonna be a little bit more convoluted as far as exactly where that theft happened. It takes a lot more investigation to uncover any details about that. Okay, now, these are a lot of photos that John, this is gonna be John's part of the presentation, but what we're talking about here, these are some pilferages that happened, I believe, in Arizona. So we're dealing, again, with a pickup truck that is towing a cargo trailer, a small cargo trailer, but they just loaded that up to the brim, both the pickup truck bed, the back seat of the pickup, and the actual cargo trailer itself with just as many boxes as they could fit off the trailer. In this case, it was large screen televisions. And in this one, I believe they were able, this was not the only vehicle, but they were able to get something like 85% of the 53-foot trailer that was packed nose to tail with televisions. Okay, these are some criminals. I wanna say that these are from Memphis. These are some of the folks that were performing rail pilferages. And one of the things we wanna point out here is that cargo theft, especially full truckload, strategic, or straight cargo theft, has by and large been a nonviolent endeavor. The criminals, again, are very risk versus reward aware, and they know that violence or threat of violence is gonna increase their sentence exponentially if they're caught. So typically, the organized cargo thief, the thief who's traveling across state lines in order to perform cargo theft, is not gonna be carrying guns, he's not going to threaten anybody, he's not going to commit any acts of violence while he's performing a cargo theft. However, the rail pilferages that we've seen in LA that also have been happening in Memphis and Chicago and Atlanta, a lot of the people who were involved in those thefts are already local street criminals who are already involved in violent crime. So for them, packing a handgun is standard operating procedure for them. So they're going to do that whether they're going to go rob a liquor store or if they're going to go and rob a train. So we always want to keep that in mind whenever we're engaging law enforcement, whenever we're engaging law enforcement for recovery or an investigation or a well check, we always want to make sure that we're giving them all the facts, all the information that we know about. And if the law enforcement officer that we're speaking to is not someone who's well versed in cargo theft, who isn't on a cargo theft task force or isn't in an area where cargo theft is prevalent enough for them to have been briefed on the situation, we want to give them all the information that they need in order to go into that situation well informed of any threats that they may encounter. Because at the end of the day, it's law enforcement who helps us recover, it's law enforcement who helps us prevent theft, and they are the greatest partner we have in the war against cargo theft. So we definitely want to make sure that they are safe when they are out there responding. All right, so poll number two, how should you vet your carriers? In instances of fraudulent theft or strategic theft, often it's something that can be uncovered if you're doing your due diligence. How do you do that due diligence? Are you going to do a Google search? Are you going to look on Google Maps? Are you going to check the SAFER website? Or are you going to consult folks in the industry and see what the industry knowledge stacks up towards what you're seeing? Or are you going to do all of the above? All right, SAFER website, definitely the first stop. So for anyone who said SAFER website, that's not the wrong answer, but all of the above is usually my favorite answer in a multiple choice poll. You want to use Google, you want to use Google Maps, and you want to use industry knowledge. SAFER is your first stop. Make sure the US DOT number that's on the tractor matches up with the information that's on that tractor. Make sure it matches up with the information you were given about who's coming to pick up your shipment. But from there, you need to go a little bit further, because a lot of times these are fraudulent carriers who are legitimately registered. And so SAFER will look completely accurate and everything will check out on SAFER, but then Google them. Does all the information match? Look at it on Google Maps. Does the address look like a house? I mean, that's actually pretty common, especially if it's a one or two driver carrier. But is that DBA or doing business as address for that carrier a single family residence, but they have 300 drivers? That's a red flag. Also, industry knowledge. Jeff and Curtis were mentioning that we work together on a lot of things and we call each other whenever we have questions about something. That is 100% accurate. Information sharing and networking is key in this industry. So industry knowledge is definitely a card you should have up your sleeve if you have access to it. And if you don't have access to it, get access to it, please. All right. So now we're going to go ahead and talk about a couple of recoveries that we did. One of our clients had suffered three losses in three weeks. All these losses were discovered on the same day because due to personnel shortages and delays in inventory, they weren't able to count all of the trailers that had come in, all the inventory that came in off of trailers. So they did a count and on the same day, they realized that these three shipments that happened on three different weeks all arrived with a pretty serious shortage in the inventory that was supposed to be on the trailer. Now, our LA Connect team, that's myself, that's John, that's Bobby, that's several other people in our company, pretty quickly realized they all had the same driver and they all had the same carriers. Daljeet Singh of Janjua Transport. They all had a red zone stop at the same truck stop. It's on East Guwasti Road in Ontario, California. There's actually two truck stops that basically look like one. If you're familiar with the area, I'm sure you know which one I'm talking about. Now, one of the things we looked at as well when we were doing this investigation is some of these security checks, some of these proactive presence of mind things that you need to do if you want to enhance your security. I mean, you look at the driver, you look at the driver's license, those are not the same person. The guy who's standing there is definitely not the guy who's in the driver's license picture. Okay, we were able to find out through our investigation that CDL was stolen from a legitimate CDL driver while he was on vacation in Vegas. So that was, I guess, one method that they used and it looks like that might have been the first one that kind of evolved into a whole host of other fabricated and stolen identities that they used. Now, what happened is another shipment was set to be picked up with Daljeet Singh as the driver in the same Janjua transport. We were notified, our Eleconnect team was notified within a couple of hours of the scheduled pickup and it was decided that we were going to set up a sting and try and catch these guys. Now, for us, a recovered load is actually a loss. To win for us is to prevent theft. So now, of course, we definitely want to recover it if it is stolen, but it should have never been stolen in the first place. That's our goal, right? So this definitely made me nervous because I'd rather, I would have told them, no, just don't give them the load, just keep it and then we don't have to do a recover. We have your shipment. But they wanted to go ahead and see if we could get an arrest or interrupt this crew and that's also a very good option. So we went ahead and we set up multiple devices embedded in the cargo. This crew was aware that there is a remote compliance monitoring device on the shipment and they are very well versed in how the logistics industry works. So they knew exactly what they could do to not get caught in the moment. That's how they got away with the three previous pilferages. And so for this one, we know that they were expecting for that first compliance monitoring device to be on the shipment. So we definitely put that one plain as it usually is on the tail of the trailer on the last pallet. But then we also embedded multiple devices in the cargo. And if you look at the inset picture there, you can just barely see the device peeking out behind that hole in the cardboard box and the pallet wrap. So what we did is we actually deployed an on-the-ground response team to follow the shipment. And we also engaged California Highway Patrol, another, that's one of the cargo theft task forces, that's the cargo theft task force in California, is a cargo theft interdiction program with the California Highway Patrol. And we work with them quite frequently as well. So we definitely notified them of what was going on and they were very interested to be involved as well. Now our on-the-ground response team followed that shipment to the same shipment on East Guwashti Road, which you can see on the map down there. It's a TA and a pilot travel center on either side of North Millican Avenue just off the San Bernardino Freeway. They followed the shipment to that same truck stop that the other three had also located at. The driver called in and stated that he was stopping for fuel, but they did not stop for fuel. They parked in a paid lot. They paid at a guard shack. It was gated and fenced in and monitored with CCTVs. And they dropped that trailer there. Tractor departed, went a few miles away to pick up another individual, returned to the truck stop. Once they did that, they backed up another trailer that they owned to the customer's trailer and actually manually transloaded the shipment off of the original trailer into their trailer by just backing them up tail-to-tail in the parking lot. And that's one of the things that's amazing to me because, you know, we always say, you know, go for secure parking, go for well-lit, guarded, fenced-in parking. And somebody who was doing remote compliance monitoring, excuse me, looking at this would have said like, hey, it's a truck stop, you know, or he's in this particular portion of the truck stop, which is a paid gated lot, you know, we probably shouldn't worry about it. But he was using this quote-unquote secure area to perform the theft, right? Because no one was going to get in there unless they paid at the guard shack. And so the only people going in there were going to be other truckers and they're typically not going to bother you with this type of thing. So overnight, you know, that other trailer was brought in, parked tail-to-tail with the customer's trailer, and they transloaded the cargo from one into the other. And then they actually sealed the new trailer with the original seal. One of the things I was talking, one of the things I forgot to mention when I was talking about double loading, especially in California, the biggest red flag we see is the seal trailer hasp, or I'm sorry, the trailer seal hasp is the little latch where you put the seal in on the back of the trailer. Now there should be a rivet on the top and a rivet on the bottom that holds that hasp in there. And what we're seeing more and more, almost standard practice again, is that that's not a rivet, that's a nut and a bolt, same on the bottom. Now if that happens, they can actually remove the hasp and remove the seal from the trailer door, open both doors to the trailer without breaking the seal, and then reattach the seal once they've done anything that they need to do and close the trailer back up. So in this case, they removed the original seal from the original trailer and put the original seal on the new trailer. Now what they're doing this for, again, because they have an intimate knowledge of how the logistics industry works, and apparently they have an intimate knowledge of how investigations and recovery works as well, they knew that we would be looking for a particular trailer, trailer number 007 with license plate ABC123. And if we go and find that trailer and it doesn't have the stolen merchandise that was reported stolen to the local police department, then there was no recovery, we can't prove there was a theft, et cetera. And they're just frustrating the investigation. It's what I call the shell game, because they're kind of like, where's your card, what shell is the ball under that type of thing, right? Where they're just moving things around in order to generate more lead time for themselves. So while this was happening, while we had on the ground response team watching this first shipment, a second shipment was picked up. And again, this is why you need proactive security, this is why you need proactive due diligence, because we can say it all we want, but if the folks at the loading dock, if the folks at the distribution center aren't looking for what they're supposed to be looking for, things are going to happen, and then you're going to have to engage a recovery service, kind of like what we do. But everybody at this facility should have been aware of what was going on. And then when this second driver shows up, last name Singh does not match the CDL photo. And if you'll look, there's no license plate on the trailer, not a paper license plate, there's no license plate on that trailer. There's no way I would have let this tractor trailer, this driver leave with my cargo. There's just no way. I don't care how busy it is. I don't care, you know, how quickly we need to get this over there. It's like, this is just way too many red flags. But the shipment departs, and it goes to the exact same Ontario truck stop on East Guwasti Road, goes into the same parking lot, you know, pays the same toll at the same guard booth in order to get into the same area. And they start doing the same thing, they start transloading it into a different trailer. And then the suspects actually depart, they leave both trailers there, actually all four trailers there, the two empty, and the two that they had, you know, moved the cargo into, and then they depart. So we ended up going in there, we engaged California Highway Patrol Cargo Theft Interdiction Program in order to perform the recovery. Now, not knowing specifically which trailers it had been moved into, we obtained warrants based on Wi-Fi locations. We were able to have our private security out there, basically combing the area with a Wi-Fi hotspot. And then our device would say, okay, we see the Wi-Fi hotspot, it narrowed down the area that we were going to be looking through in this particular parking lot. And then we were able to discover that they had used the original seals. So once we figured that out, it was much quicker to locate the other trailer. And then one of the original trailers had actually been loaded with another, not client, they weren't our client, but somebody else's stolen cargo had been loaded into one of the original trailers. So we actually recovered three shipments that day, two for a client and one for someone who wasn't our client. But that was very interesting. We identified that they were using the same blue coated padlocks, it was like your typical master lock, but it was completely coated in a blue vinyl. So that's how we found the third trailers, because that one had actually been locked with the same lock that was on the two new trailers they moved our client's cargo into. The trailers were open, the product was recovered, and it was a great day. There were a couple of arrests made as well. Now there was a second round. It was about six months later, same client, had five shipments scheduled in the same day for fraudulent pickup. So they weren't, they were kind of going for the big score at this point, right? They're not going to spread it out over a few weeks, a few months, or whatever. They're going for five shipments in one day. Now our LE Connect team identified all five shipments based on previous intelligence. You know, we've been doing investigations, not just on the folks that we know about, but the folks that are associated with them, searching for common phone numbers between carriers. A lot of carriers will be registered under the same phone number, or be registered to the same address, or one particular individual's name might be tied to several carriers. So we've got a list of bad actors now that we're always looking at, and we were able to identify those five shipments. Four of them were proactively prevented from leaving. One of them did slip through the cracks. We were, however, able to recover that one, have it successfully escorted back to origin. Now all five shipments were scheduled under different carrier names. They did not use Janjua Transport again. They were scheduled under all five different names, and all five with different USDOT numbers. Not all of those USDOT numbers matched up with the name that was on the placard on the tractor. So that's another reason, you know, you've got to do this due diligence. Every time somebody shows up, look up the DOT number on SAFER. See if the name that's on SAFER matches the placard that's on there. Then go ahead and Google the phone number that's on SAFER. Just copy paste the phone number, put it into Google, see if it pulls up directly to that carrier, or see if it's associated with any other businesses, associated with any other individuals, and do a little bit more investigation just to see if it's tied to anything that may be nefarious. If you have industry contacts, reach out to your industry contacts. I don't know a single person in this industry who is not eager to share information if it's going to stop a cargo thief, if it's going to help law enforcement apprehend a cargo thief. I don't know anybody who wouldn't help anybody else with information if they could. So it's a great industry to be in from that perspective, and like I said, if you don't have industry contacts who have that kind of knowledge, get them. Please do, because it is a massive, massive help. So we were able to recover that one of the five that did slip through the cracks, and it stopped within the red zone near origin, not at that same truck stop on Guwashti Road, but what they did is they surrounded the tractor trailer with other trailers, vehicles, dumpsters, and originally we were thinking maybe that's to interfere with the remote monitoring device. Through further investigations, I can't really reveal all of the details in a public forum, we determined they were actually very likely using a GPS jammer, and they were using the surrounding vehicles, the dumpsters, the other trailers, to limit the reach of that jammer, because that is something that the police will definitely respond to. That is a federal offense, using a GPS jammer, and it's much easier, it's funny to say this out loud, but it is much easier to put someone away for using a GPS jammer than it is for stealing a load of electronics, depending on how they stole it, right? If they just punched the driver, took his keys, and drove off in his tractor trailer, that's easy, they're going to put them away, that's not a big deal, but if they're performing some sort of strategic theft, or fictitious pickup, or fraudulent carrier identity, that can be a lot more difficult to stop in the act. You've got to be able to prove that, because otherwise, if you can't prove that there's criminal activity happening, a law enforcement officer may just be like, you know, this is a civil issue, and I can't arrest somebody for a civil issue, that's an issue that a judge needs to deal with in a court. So if you can, you need to be able to prove that it's actual theft, that somebody's fabricating an identity, that they're in the act of committing a crime, versus in the act of breach of contract, because breach of contract, again, that's a civil issue. Unfortunately, a lot of times, we can't have a great response from law enforcement if it's a civil issue. So knowing what exactly you need to nail down, what information you have to have to support law enforcement, so they can do what they need to do, is also very crucial. So now the driver, during this, you know, we knew what was going on, but the driver and the carrier had provided false location information, they said, no, no, I'm almost to the Arizona border, you know, like, we were calling them, telling them to bring it back to origin, you know, we know where you are, and it's like, no, no, I'm not there, I'm near the Arizona border, like, I'm not going to turn around, you guys do what you need to do, right? But the investigative calls to the carrier, to the driver, prompted the suspects to go ahead and move the tractor and trailer from where they were hiding it, you know, behind all these dumpsters and other trailers. And our on-the-ground response team, which was watching them this entire time, surveilling them the entire time, noted the arrival when they arrived to that trailer that had been left there. And were able to coordinate the successful return of the shipment to origin, so they were actually able to get it just escorted back to the origin. The driver, the entire time, was still claiming that it wasn't stolen. We're like, well, why were you telling us it was in Arizona? And he's like, got real tight-lipped all of a sudden, as they tend to. That was a very interesting recovery, and most of this crew is still active. Most of this crew is still at large and still active, and something we definitely expect to see in the coming weeks in Southern California. We know they've been targeting other electronics shippers who are not our clients, and we expect them to continue to do so until they're forced to stop, essentially. All right, so poll number three. Your driver calls you and tells you your cargo was stolen. What is the first thing that you should do? Call 911, inform dispatch if you're not already dispatched, inform the remote monitoring center, or check with other trucks in the area for additional thefts. I'll give you about enough time for me to sing the Jeopardy theme song in my head. All right, call 911, inform remote monitoring center. Perfect. If you've attended any cargo theft seminars or supply chain security seminars, especially the ones where law enforcement is present, they're going to tell you, if you're calling 911, you've already lost. 911 is great, and we're all trained to call 911 in the event of emergency, but cargo theft is not a violent crime. It's going to be deprioritized, and also you're likely not going to get to somebody who knows what cargo theft is or how it's done. What you need to do, the first thing you should do, is inform your remote monitoring center. And why is that? Because your remote monitoring center is going to activate a team of people who are going to do all the things at once, right, except for call 911. What we're going to do is we're going to call cargo theft task forces. We're going to call sergeants and detectives who know exactly what's going on, who know the hotspots in the area, who know the MOs of the criminals in the area, and know exactly where to look and what to look for. Now, call 911, I mean, all of us have to do it sometimes, you know, like, there's not a cargo theft task force in every state in the Union, in every city in the state, etc. As a matter of fact, cargo theft task forces have been declining for quite a while now, which means we're removing law enforcement specialties, specializations in cargo theft, which is just a shame, because these costs are definitely being passed on to consumers. But you do want to inform the remote monitoring center because they will call dispatch, they will inform law enforcement, the most effective law enforcement contact, whether that is 911 if there's no other options, local police or sheriff, or preferably a member of a cargo theft task force. And we will also contact, you know, the business, the location of the theft and see if there were any other trucks that were affected in that area, as well, as well as a multitude of other things. There's a flurry of activity when a theft is reported to a remote monitoring center. The amount of people that leap into action is pretty impressive. All right, so keys to a successful recovery. Timely notification, like you have to be timely notified of the theft taking place. Accurate information. The last thing you want to do is frustrate anyone who may be responding by providing them inaccurate information. If you tell them that they're looking for a blue freight liner with a orange trailer behind it, and they're actually looking for a red Kenworthy with with a white trailer behind it. Every time you tell them something that's inaccurate, they're going to wonder whether the next thing you tell them is accurate or not. So, having accurate information at the tip of your fingers is very important for a rapid response. Right, because once you're notified of the theft, you need the wheels to be in motion right away, because every second you delay is just a little bit further that that shipment is going to get away from where you know where it was at a certain time. So you need to identify the type of theft. Was it a straight theft? Was the tractor and trailer stolen from the driver? Was it a fraudulent theft? Was it a pilferage? Was it stolen off of rail? All of these have different ways to respond to them and different mechanisms that need to be activated. So knowledge of cargo thieves trends and tactics. Another really big factor when you're going to be doing this if you want to make sure that you're getting the most effective response you have to, you have to know what's going on and in some cases that means you have to make assumptions based off of the information that you do have. So having the most information you can. Pictures from origin definitely help. It's massive help. As a matter of fact, I don't want to gloss over that like it's just another factor, but thorough pictures from origin that include the driver's license, a picture of the driver, a picture of the seal, tractor, trailer that included any company markings that's on there, as well as license plates. All of this stuff is going to be hugely beneficial in trying to track down something that's stolen. If you've got a container that's traveling on a chassis, a lot of these chassis have GPS monitoring built into the chassis by the manufacturer. And those devices are often overlooked by thieves who will rip out a fleet management device of the dashboard and leave it in the in the parking lot of the truck stop. These thieves are often not going to bother with a GPS device that might be on a chassis and a lot of times you can call the manufacturer of the chassis and they might be able to get you a location for that as well. So knowing all the resources available to you is also very, very, very valuable. Hey, Danny, this is Jason. This is another recovery. This one happened, I believe, in Tennessee. Danny, can you hear me? I can. This is Jason. Jason. Yeah, you're doing a great job, man. I just, I just wanted to ask a quick question based on your prior slide about trends, right? Like, I guess, geographically, is there any sort of, are you able to kind of, if you know a certain area, identify some particular cargo thefts with a certain crew or ring or is there any common characteristics? Do they all look alike? Yeah, that's a great question. Actually, the next slide is going to answer that a little bit. We do notice that there is a definite geographic tendency towards certain MOs, specific MOs. I mean, I'm not saying that pilferage always happens on the West Coast and full truckload theft always happens in Atlanta or anything like that, but minute differences. For example, for example, this recovery that we performed in, I believe it was in Tennessee, original tractor that was picked up in was a red tractor. It was stolen from a truck stop, driven several miles away, and then repowered with a different tractor. Then it was masked, right? So you can see right there 295-515 at the top right corner. And on the right hand picture, you can actually see it's been painted over. So this was a very specific MO that I learned about from Bobby Motley, our other law enforcement liaison. A very specific member of one crew that's based out of Louisville, Kentucky, who had been in jail for, I believe Bobby Motley helped put him in jail. He'd been in jail for several years. And he had been released a couple of months before we started seeing this particular MO for shipments that had departed the Louisville, Kentucky area. Didn't mean that the thefts were happening in Kentucky, but they were being followed from origin. And then like I alluded to, once the shipment was stolen, it would be driven 15 or 20 miles away, usually in the opposite direction of where they're intending to take it ultimately. And then it's going to be repowered with a different tractor. They may remark the trailer, mask the markings on the trailer and put new markings on there. And then they may or may not sit on it to see if there's any response. In this particular case, they didn't. They painted over the numbers and immediately started moving down the road. And thanks to some sharp eyed law enforcement, we were able to get them pictures and verbally describe to them exactly what they were looking for, despite them not being trained cargo theft officers or on a cargo theft task force. Sharp eyes of these cops out there, man. They were driving down the highway at highway speeds, full speed, and he noticed like, hey, this trailer says 6487, but it's got that same Great Dane logo. It's got that same vent on the door. And hey, if I look up where the number should have been, it looks freshly painted. Right. So they were able to pull over that tractor, and we got a full recovery. So that was really, really awesome. And that's again, because we know that in this particular area of the country, thieves are going to do this particular type of MO. They're going to go ahead and if they steal the entire tractor trailer, they're going to try and paint over it, which is also why they try and go for white trailers. Because if they stole, you know, a Schneider trailer, which is bright orange, it's much harder to try and disguise that trailer as not an orange Schneider trailer. So white trailers are ubiquitous, and they tend to, they tend to be part of what makes something low hanging fruit. If this particular crew is going for it, if they know that it's going to be easy for them to perform their preferred method of masking, then they're definitely going to look at that one as a, as a riper target than one that maybe wasn't. Yeah, that does bring me to the end of the presentation, although if there are any questions I'm happy to answer them. I do apologize it was a little bit shorter we didn't have the law enforcement liaison perspective from John again he's nobly doing his recovery duties. So I'm sure he's going to be successful as well. But if there's any questions at all. I'm happy to answer them. Yeah, Danny we got one in now. How often are your customers coming to you proactively ahead of potential risk versus reactively after they experience a theft. Not as many as I would like. Not as many as I would like. You know, that's a great question that unfortunately I don't think I can answer 100% accurately because I'm not on the client side and more on the operation side. I'd have to ask some of our account managers, but I do believe that the trend is typically it's reactive. Security is very rarely seen as an as a proactive investment. It's usually seen as a reaction to an event that's happened. And unfortunately, that means that you know if security is working and no more of those events happen. A lot of times, it falls off of the attention span from the C suite and doesn't quite get the budget that it might need. Yeah. Got it. Got it. Hey, guys, definitely feel free to use the chat box. If you have any questions. Earlier in the presentation, you actually alluded to proactive due diligence on behalf of some of our collective insurance being that we're an audience of primarily underwriters. What exactly does that look like again from your perspective. Again, it's doing research vetting the carriers is probably the number one. I don't want to call it a silver bullet because there is no silver bullet and preventing cargo theft, but vetting your carriers knowing who exactly is carrying your, your, your shipment who's carrying your freight and knowing that you can trust them, making sure you've got good relationships in place. And good agreements so that you know you're, it's not allowed for them to double or triple broker your shipment, especially without your knowledge. I mean, I understand capacity is what it is. Sometimes it has to happen, but you've got to have a trusted network of carriers who aren't going to keep you on hold going down a phone tree that's 12 people deep, trying to find a phone number of a driver when you should have that at your fingertips. I mean, in a theft scenario. If a shipment's been double or triple brokered and the remote monitoring center doesn't know who the actual driver who has it is, it's going to make it much more difficult in order to get any answers from anybody who's on the ground. Fantastic, fantastic. All very good, good information there. I think one of the questions that came up in the earlier presentation today was around pilot cars. Do you oftentimes see these pilot cars, are they marked, unmarked? Are they a better, is one better than another? Definitely unmarked is better. Because again, security through obscurity. I mean, again, it depends on the location of the geography. There are certain areas where armed guards in a marked car are going to be a deterrent. As a matter of fact, I can't think of anywhere where armed guards in a marked car are not going to be a deterrent. But there's still, you know, some places where they're going to go in anyways, depending on what's in that shipment. Or if they suspect that, you know, that level of protection just makes them assume that it's going to be worth it anyways. There's parts of the world where criminal organizations have much higher firepower than law enforcement or private security. Especially, you know, if it's a marked car, that makes it pretty easy to know the extent of the security that's in place, right? Because you see one marked car, you don't see any other marked cars, you see two guys in there. You know, if you've got six guys and you're suburban, you've got decent odds, right? But in the U.S., in the U.S., if you're going to escort, I would suggest unmarked cars. And the same thing actually in most of Latin America. But after that, you know, I wouldn't want to make too broad of a generalization on any other specific country because it really does vary by specific local area. Got it. In reference to a pre-route planning, is that something that you're a big fan of? And is it best to have regularly set stops where you're going to known locations? I know you gave an example earlier of a terminal that got hit, but is it best to go to the same pre-planned stops each and every time? Or is it good to kind of mix it up to try to keep criminals off course? Yeah, if you have options, vary it. Definitely don't make anything a routine. But I say if you have options, meaning like, you know, oftentimes there's not a lot of great options. Again, leaving the LAX Inland Empire area of California, if you're coming up into Barstow, California, there's a truck stop in Barstow, California. There's a couple of truck stops in Barstow, California, but they're all right next to each other. Those are the only truck stops for 200 miles in any direction, 150 miles in any direction. But you get my point, right? That's obviously going to be where almost everybody's going to stop. If they're stopping as they go through Barstow, they're going to stop in that area at one of those two or three truck stops that's at that intersection. So at that point, you don't have a lot of options in terms of where you're going to stop along that intersection. So in that case, that's where route pre planning comes in and you say you shouldn't stop there. You shouldn't stop in areas where you have limited choice, you know, because then everyone's going to be there. That's going to be all the fish are in that little barrel and easy to shoot. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, fantastic. Well, this is the conclusion of the transportation forum. I hope everybody found this as beneficial as I did. Some really neat information. Before we close, we have some closing announcements. And we actually have a final trivia question, which we'll have here in one second. But also want to remind you guys of a link to the electronic survey, which should be in the chat box of the control panel. So make sure you guys check that out. Definitely tell us what you think about today's program. Again, it's always good to kind of get these external industry experts to kind of come in and pour into us as an underwriting group so that we can all make good decisions on behalf of the carriers that we represent. So, again, thank you for your time, Danny, man. It's been awesome. And, you know, we hear John hate that John could be a part of the time, but definitely in action. Right. It's kind of cargo security in action. So I'm more alive of a fish. Can we can we get there? So that's awesome. Well, thank you, Jason. It's been a pleasure. Yeah, for sure. So with that said, I'll hit you guys with the last trivia question here. Just type the correct response into the question box. And keeping with our November holiday theme trivia questions earlier, we did Veterans Day. This question is in honor of Thanksgiving, which, believe it or not, is here next week if you're not ready. But which president made turkey pardoning an annual Thanksgiving event? Was it A. JFK, John F. Kennedy, B. George H.W. Bush, C. Barack Obama or D. Richard Nixon? You guys feel free to throw that in the chat box and we will pick a winner here. Give you guys a few to answer. All right. And it looks like we do have a winner. This one is going to be Erica Perry. Big shout out to you, George H.W. Bush. You got it. He was the the one that pardoned the turkeys, even though I'm sure we're all partaking in some sort of turkey eating. So lucky, lucky turkey on that end. Appreciate everyone. Everyone's time. Again, fantastic presentation. Thanks to Lillian and Eileen and Kevin and the whole crew. And we just appreciate it. And if you guys please complete those surveys. And beyond that, if you were a winner of any of the Amazon gift cards, we'll be sure to get those over to you. But appreciate everyone's time. That's it, guys. Have a great day. Thank you.

Transportation Forum

Inland Marine Underwriters Association

armed aggressive cargo theft

Southern California

electronics theft

computers

cryptocurrency market

memory theft

hard drives theft

CPUs theft

Ecuadorian groups

Indian groups

pre-route planning

security measures

cargo theft trends